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ABSTRACT
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN KAZAKHSTAN DURING YEARS OF
INDEPENDENCE: 1991-2002
Dissolution of the USSR was one of the most fascinating events of the twentieth 
century. It altered world’s geopolitical structure and symbolized the end of the Cold War. 
The year 1991 was a crucial landmark for the Newly Independent States to gain their 
sovereign status and become equal members of the international community. Since then 
the United States, as a super power, kept an eye on the development processes of each ex- 
Soviet state, and particularly those of Central Asia. The US policy-makers were 
concerned about the appearance of unstable spots on the Eurasian continent, which could 
have the spillover effect on neighboring countries.
Kazakhstan, as one of the leading Central Asian states, is the main focus of our 
research due to its crucial geopolitical location, possession of rich natural resources, its 
multi-ethnicity, its inheritance of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and many other factors 
which make this country unique and worthy of deep investigation. Though many IR 
scholars believed the Unites States did not have any interests in Central Asia, having the 
luxury of distance, this perception proved to be erroneous.
The aim of this research is to classify US interests in Central Asia, particularly in 
Kazakhstan, to examine the main directions of the American policy in the region, to 
emphasize the importance of bilateral cooperation between the United States and 
Kazakhstan, which could be beneficial for both, to give critical evaluation of US 
undertakings in the region, and to reflect on future perspectives of further collaboration.
This work intends to supplement the worldwide ongoing research on Central 
Asian countries, and we hope that it will change the misperception that the region is an 
exotic and remote comer of the world. Only an accurate understanding of each country’s 
peculiarities may help the United States formulate clear and coherent policy, and assist 
Central Asian states in building stable and truly independent societies.
ÖZET
ABD’NİN BAĞIMSIZ KAZAKİSTAN’A YÖNELİK POLİTİKASI: 1991-2002
Sovyetler Birliği’nin çözülmesi yirminci yüzyılın en çarpıcı olaylarından birisiydi. 
Dünya jeopolitiğini değiştirdi ve Soğuk Savaşın sonunu simgeledi. 1991 yılı, 
bağımsızlığına yeni kavuşan ülkeler için, egemenliklerini ve uluslararası düzeyde eşit 
statü elde etmeleri açısından bir dönüm noktası teşkil etti. O tarihten bu yana bir süper 
devlet olarak ABD, tüm yeni bağımsız devletlerdeki ve özel olarak Orta Asya’daki 
gelişmeleri yakından izlemektedir. ABD özellikle Avrasya’da yeni istikrarsız bölgelerin 
ortaya çıkmasından ve istikrarsızlıkların yayılmasından endişe duymaktadır.
Kazakistan, önemli bir Orta Asya ülkesi olarak, bizim araştırmalarımızın 
merkezini teşkil edecektir. Kazakistan çok önemli bir jeopolitik konuma ve zengin tabii 
kaynaklara sahiptir. Ayrıca Sovyet nükleer silahlarının mirasçısı olması ve pek çok 
sayıda etnik grubu içinde barındırması bakımından da üzerinde araştırma yapmaya değer 
bir ülkedir. Olaylar bazı akademisyenlerin Kazakistan’ın önemini küçümseyen 
görüşlerini yalanlanmıştır.
Bu araştırmanın amacı ABD’ nin Orta Asya’daki, özellikle Kazakistan’daki, 
çıkarlarını tasnif etmek, incelemek. Amerikan politikasının temel yönlerini ortaya 
koymak ve ABD ile Kazakistan arasında geliştirilmekte olan işbirliğinin önemini 
vurgulamak olacaktır.
Bu çalışmanın başka bir amacı da, tüm dünyada Orta Asya üzerine yürütülmekte 
olan araştırmalara katkıda bulunmak ve o bölgeyi egzotik, uzak bir diyar olarak gören 
yanlış izlenimleri düzeltmeye çalışmak olacaktır. Ancak her ülkenin özelliklerini isabetle 
tespit edebilen bir yaklaşım, ABD’nin tutarlı politikalar geliştirmesine ve Orta Asya’da 
istikrarlı ve gerçekten bağımsız toplumlar inşa edilmesine yardımcı olmasına katkıda 
bulunabilir.
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INTRODUCTION
. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant event in our century, re­
shaping the whole world structure geographically and politically. The end of the Cold 
War brought into existence newly independent states, which were given a big challenge 
to survive and to reform their internal system of governance. However, it is a big task for 
a state to build a new stable society with a new way of thinking and even a new national 
identity. Hence, without any external help from the developed countries directed to 
social, financial and political spheres, the new state could become highly volatile and 
could easily fall under extreme and radical influence of internal and external forces, such 
as terrorism, drug trafficking, Islamic fundamentalism, and others.
The region of focus in this research is Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan. It is 
a unique country with strong traditions, vast territory, intriguing history, nuclear 
inheritance, rich oil and mineral reserves, and a multi-ethnic population. This country’s
■?
geostrategic importance is evident. Today Kazakhstan attraets the attention of Western 
powers, such as the United States, and affects the common world attitude toward the 
region, which previously was considered as the world’s outback.
Although many scholars and politicians believe that America does not have any 
vital interests in the region, in this research we try to evinee that the United States 
understands the importance of the region and it is interested in promoting further 
cooperation with regional states. The research questions we intend to answer are: What 
place does Kazakhstan have in US foreign policy-making? Why is this region crucial for 
the United States, and what particular interests does the US have in Central Asia? To
what extent should the influence by neighboring countries on Kazakhstan be taken into 
account? What were the flaws and positive achievements of bilateral American- 
Kazakhstan relations? To what extent was Washington successful in achieving its goals? 
What are the perspectives for future cooperation?
Thus the first chapter shows the new significant role of independent Kazakhstan, 
as one of the leading Central Asian states, which has chosen a democratic way of 
development after the USSR dissolution. The geostrategic importance of this country 
justifies the vitality of US involvement. The United States, as a super power, is in the 
strongest position to influence democratization, respect for human rights, transition to 
free market economy, denuclearization and integration of a Central Asian state into the 
international community - at the same time, cutting off the possibility for anti-Western 
Islamic fundamentalism to emerge in Kazakhstan. The research analyzes gradual 
cooperation development, starting from de facto and de jure recognition of the Republic. 
Besides, special attention is given to the changes in the foreign policy-making of different 
US Administrations toward Kazakhstan during its years of independence.
The second chapter is devoted solely to the goals and interests of the United 
States in Kazakhstan. First and foremost, the priority is given to strengthening society 
and ensuring internal stability in Kazakhstan via political and economic reforms, 
democratization and human rights policy, and full membership in international 
organizations. The fear of Central Asian possible Islamic radicalization, due to the 
proximity to Islamic countries, has drawn attention of the United States to this part of the 
world. The security risks were very high, especially if to take into account Kazakhstani
huge nuclear inheritance. It is a vital US interest to prevent the creation of a nuclear 
power in this unstable region, which is close to Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. This 
fact presupposed the US decision to assist the removal of nuclear arsenal from 
Kazakhstan, and to contain the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking in the region. 
These negative factors could harm democratization, and political, social and economic 
reform processes. In the sphere of economic cooperation, this chapter clearly shows the 
growing US interest toward Caspian rich oil and gas reserves, which are expected to 
diversify world energy supply. Moreover, the US admits that devastating ecological 
problems should be addressed as well, because they have regional implications 
threatening all neighboring states. Soviet mismanagement of the economy resulted in the 
regional ecological catastrophes such as the Aral Sea disaster, Semipalatinsk polygon 
issue, and many others.
Admitting that US involvement in Central Asian region faced with internal and 
regional obstacles -  such as, for example, inefficiency of the legal system, regional 
powers’ intention to competitively fill-in the power vacuum in Central Asia, - our 
attention should not be diverted from the positive achievements the United States had in 
the region. Accordingly, the purpose of the third chapter is to critically examine US- 
Kazakhstan bilateral cooperation, failures and successes of the US foreign policy in 
Kazakhstan. Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned arguments, this thesis 
presents an attempt to estimate not only possibilities of future cooperation between the 
United States and Kazakhstan, but also the negative and dangerous outcomes, which 
could occur in case the region is neglected.
The significant feature of the proposed research is that it tries to present different 
perspectives and approaches put forward not only by English-speaking scholars, 
politicians and observers, but also their Russian and Kazakh colleagues. Such a multi­
perspective approach will pave the way for a deeper and broader analysis of the topic. 
Interviews with US Embassy representatives, US Library sources, online material, 
current publications on Central Asia and Transcaucasia, various journal editions in 
Russian, English and Kazakh languages will provide an important basis to better 
understand the situation in the region and the US reaction to it. Moreover, this work is 
going to supplement the ongoing worldwide research on Central Asia, providing an 
opportunity to expand the limited knowledge about the region itself.
CHAPTER I. KAZAKHSTAN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A NEW 
PARTNER OF THE UNITED STATES ?
1.1 Collapse of the USSR and the Emergence of New States in Central Asia: The 
Case of Kazakhstan
The year 1991 was significant in terms of presenting a completely new Central 
Asian world to the rest of the international community, which previously had little and 
obscure knowledge about this region. This extraordinary phenomenon of the end of the 
Cold War symbolized at the same time the beginning of the new era with newly bom 
independent states joining international politics. It was an important historical step of 
transformation from communist regime to democratic system of governance, from 
command economy to free market economy, from one-party rule to pluralism -  the whole 
Soviet massive political, economic and social machine collapsed.
A new Central Asia, once has experienced the Soviet past, would never come 
back to it again. Russia would still be crucial for this region but not as a dominant power. 
Five new Central Asian states -  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan - have taken their own place in the geopolitical space engaging themselves into 
cooperation with international community on the basis of equal partnership. Meanwhile, 
the primary concern for these new states should be the shaping of their national identity 
and clarification of their political and economic interests.
1.1.1 Kazakhstan -  a New Independent State: Soviet Legacy and Independent 
Path
The end of the bipolar world brought a big debate into the scholarly circles. IR 
scholars and political observers were trying to predict the future ‘destiny’ of Newly 
Independent States (NIS), which were highly influenced by Moscow decision-making for 
more than seventy decades.
Among various predictions concerning the future model of the region, there were
two points mostly discussed: first, that the region would follow Turkish model o f western-
style democracy, second, the Iranian model o f Islamic fundamentalism. But, in fact, the
reality still anchored Central Asian states to Russia because the main concern to preserve
stability was the number one issue for the leaders and for the population of the region -
and in those circumstances Russia was the only reliable option. As Assan Nougmanov,
the Kazakh researcher, shared his opinion:
“there is one circumstance that may to a great extent shelter Central Asia from 
instability, although not eliminate it completely. This circumstance is Russia’s 
role in Asia and the Near East. Central Asia is certainly within the sphere of  
Russia’s geopolitical ambition.”'
However, Russia didn’t have the same economic potential, as did the USSR. Now 
it became more problematic to help all other states within the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States), hence. Central Asian states were left to survive without Russia’s 
help in the circumstances of growing economic and demographic crisis. But on the other
' Assan Nougmanov, “Kazakhstan’s Challenges: The Case o f a Central Asian Nation in Transition”, 
Harvard International Review, vol. XV, no. 3 (Spring 1993), p. 12 cited by Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian 
Policy Debate on Central Asia, (Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1995).
hand, Russia faced a dilemma as soon as it could not afford the creation of a giant zone of 
instability on its borders.
At the beginning of 90s, Russia didn’t completely define for itself the significance 
of Central Asian region, and to what extent its commitments in the post-Soviet territory 
should go. Moreover, a rivalry among various institutions and public figures complicated 
the clarification of the strategic vision. As aptly noticed Irina Zviagelskaia, there were 
two opposite approaches toward Central Asia that evolved in Russian policymaking 
circles: the first perception was that Central Asia presented an economic, political and 
military burden to Russia. Being “culturally alien to it, the region should ... become a 
part of an ‘expanded Middle East’ rather than stay with Russia’’^ , so that the best option 
for Russia could be complete withdrawal from the region; the second vision for Russian 
involvement was to maintain its control of the region, otherwise Central Asian countries 
would be involved in alliances hostile to Russia. The problem with the first option is that 
in the case of Russia’s alienation millions of Russians living in Northern Kazakhstan 
would be deprived of Russia’s protection.
As far as Kazakhstan’s own perception of its independence concerned, it had 
developed from the obscure fearful attitude toward independent confidence in attaining 
success and integrating into international community on the basis of equality. Henceforth, 
Kazakhstan took its own independent path without blindly following other development 
models, though learning the best experiences of different civilizations.^ Of course, the 
first post-Soviet shock was understandable. Straight after the collapse of the USSR 
Central Asian countries still felt themselves bound to the “center” psychologically, as
 ^Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p. 35.
 ^ The Message of the President of Kazakhstan to the Nation, “Development Strategy of Kazakhstan -  
2030”, Kazahstanskaya Pravda, (11 October 1997).
well as by a myriad of formal and informal links. For example, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union newly independent states acquired only those fragments of the Soviet 
military machine, which were based on their territory, and made it impossible to 
accomplish many military tasks.“^
Needless to say, the whole state structure had to be re-organized, new 
Constitution and laws had to be written, new currency had to be introduced, even new 
type of mentality had to be fostered. Undoubtedly, all changes needed strong fínancial 
support, which resulted in adopting state policy oriented on attraction of foreign 
investments and creation of favorable environment for the development of international 
business partnership.
Kazakhstan understood that in order to create necessary climate for long-term 
investments the country shouldn’t depend on its relations only with one country, namely 
Russia^. Thus, on the eve of the twenty-first century, Kazakhstan defined its own life 
formula -  to make a necessary shift from confrontation toward partnerships. And as a tool 
of foreign policy independent Kazakhstan chose integration^. On this basis were held 
many initiatives:
the Commonwealth o f Independent States was founded in Almaty, on the 
initiative of Kazakhstan, “which prevented chaos and bloodshed on the FSU
It was problematic not to have even the semblance o f a complete system in the form of a grouping of 
troops, mobilization deployment schemes, command and control agencies, and munitions. Moreover, most 
of the post-Soviet republics were inexperienced in building up an army and organizing for defence; they 
did not have trained military specialists and officers, especially not among the titular nationalities. See 
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p. 29.
 ^ The Message of the President of Kazakhstan to the Nation, “Development Strategy of Kazakhstan -  
2030”, (11 October 1997).
 ^R. M. Kalieva, “O Diplomatii I Glasnosti”, Kazahstanskaya Pravda, (8 November 1997).
 ^ The Message of the President of Kazakhstan to the Nation, “Development Strategy of Kazakhstan -  
2030”, (11 October 1997).
territory, and slowed the process of alienation of the former brotherly 
nations”* ;
- the Eurasian Union;
Central Asian Union (and its peacekeeping battalion, Customs Union);
the Conference on Coordination and Trust Measures in Asia (CCTMA), and
others.
1.1.2 National Identity: Change or Continuity in the Post-Cold War World?
Central Asian countries started defining their own geopolitical orientation, which 
could alter political and military equations from China to the Persian Gulf. But first of all 
they had to reach an understanding of the fundamental elements of statehood and 
determine their national identity: What is their national character? Are they “westerners” 
-  as a result of inclusion for over a century and a half in western (Russian) state? Or are 
they Asians, looking more toward the East? Or are they Turks, associated first and 
foremost with other Turkish states, especially Ankara?^ But, in that case, these questions 
are difficult to answer, as soon as it is heavily multinational in character.
Historically, “the eponymous peoples of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Kyrgyzstan [were] descendants of nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes that have 
migrated and jostled one another over the high Central Asian plateaus and river valleys
“ Dastan Eleukhenov, “Perspectives on security in Kazakhstan”, in G. Bertsch, C. Craft, S. Jones, and M. 
Beck (eds.). Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
(Routledge, 2000), p. 240.
 ^Graham E. Fuller, “Central Asia and American National Interests”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.). Central Asia: 
Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994), p.129-130.
from the time before the age of written history. For almost fifteen hundred years, 
beginning in the second century
Later during the period of Russian colonization as Robert Cullen had put it:
“neither tsars nor the Bolsheviks displayed much understanding of the region or 
any desire to help it toward political and economic modernity. Boundaries were 
drawn arbitrarily, and territories were misnamed. Kazakhstan, for example, 
entered the Soviet Union under the name Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Social 
Republic, because the authorities in Moscow were not sure of the differences 
between a Kazakh and a Kyrgyz.”"
The main destabilizing factor in Central Asia was the “artificial” nature of the 
republican boundaries drawn by Stalin, which left many nationals outside the boundaries 
of their own republics. Given that during Stalin’s time -  during World War II -  thousands 
of nationalist dissidents and sometime whole nationalities were deported to Central Asia. 
Kazakhstan had suffered the most from this problem of playing the role of “prison of 
nationalities”.'^ In 1937 more than 100 thousand Koreans were sent to Kazakhstan, and 
approximately 102 thousand Poles were deported as well; in autumn 1941, 361 thousand 
Germans were sent from the Volga region to Kazakhstan; during 1943-1944, 507 
thousand people from North Caucasus were violently deported to Kazakhstan'^. 
Moreover, the Soviet system following Nikita Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands campaign 
encouraged the migration of Russians to Central Asia, particularly to Kazakhstan. These 
factors dramatically changed the mono-ethnic nomadic society transferring it into a 
settled agriculture one with new ways of living. Today Kazakhstan has well over 100
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World, 
(Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 131.
" lbid.,p. 132.
Graham E. Fuller, “Central Asia and American National Interests”, in Hafeez Malik (cd.). Central Asia: 
Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (1994), p. 129-130. See also Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian 
Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p. 133.
R. M. Kalieva, “Prioriteti Vneshnih Svyazei Respubliki Kazahstan v Evraziiskom Prostranstve”, Asia, 
No. 31, (August 1994), p. 5.
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nationalities represented within its borders. Only in Kazakhstan, for example, Russians 
constitute roughly 40% of the whole population.
President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev is very sensitive to the fact that he 
rules multi-national society. He tries to find a balance between the aspirations of Kazakh 
patriots and other minority population. However, both sides sometimes cannot perceive 
the situation rationally.
The claims of native population are understandable. During the Soviet rule it was 
difficult to preserve indigenous cultural traditions and the local language’'^ . Thus 
independence brought new opportunities for greater cultural expression, although “a 
balance between the Kazak and Russian languages has posed a political dilemma for 
Kazakhstan’s policy makers.” ’^  In Kazakhstan Russian language was used for official 
intercourse, while Kazakh language'^ had more than folkloric value. Soon Kazakh was 
perceived as almost dying. This fact has compelled Nazarbayev to make Kazakh an 
official language on the grounds that Soviet policy of Russification had endangered the 
survival of the local language.
Later, eventually, the argument over the language provisions occurred: “Kazakhs 
[demanded] that their language be recognized as the sole official language; Russians 
[demanded] that both languages have identical legal status.” ’^  Moreover, the latter
R. M. Kalieva, Na Orbite Sotrudnichestva, (Almaty: “Kazakhstan”, 1992), pp. 44-45.
Online Country Guide Study at
http;//www. I upinfo.com/country-guidc-study/kazakhstan/kazakhstan25.htinl.
Kazak is part o f the Nogai-Kipchak subgroup of northeastern Turkic languages, heavily influenced by 
both Tatar and Mongol. Kazak was first written only in the 1860s, using Arabic script. In 1929 Latin script 
was introduced. In 1940 Stalin decided to unify the written materials o f the Central Asian republics with 
those of the Slavic rulers by introducing a modified form of Cyrillic. In 1992 the return of a Latin-based 
alphabet came under discussion, but the enormous costs involved appear to have stopped further 
consideration o f the idea. At hltp://www. I upinfo.com/country-guide-study/kazaklislan/kazakhstan25.html.
Martha Olcott, “Emerging Political Elites”, in A. Banuazizi, M. Weiner (eds.). The New Geopolitics of 
Central Asia and its Borderlands, (I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London, 1994), p. 59.
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claimed that Russian population doesn’t need to leam Kazakh at all, while the former 
insisted that Kazakhstan is their homeland which means that they should know not only 
culture and history, but also native language of this country. The new Constitution (1993) 
recognized Kazakh language “as the exclusive national language while guaranteeing that 
Russian has near equal rights.” '*
It is generally known that the search for the new national identity is neither an 
easy nor a quick process. And during this challenging period the most important task is to 
preserve inter-ethnic stability. Today Kazakhstan has received a worldwide recognition 
as an independent state, which territorial integrity is respected. And while formulating its 
own policy, the newly bourn country has to put as a priority the creation of national 
identity which unites or at least encompasses the multiethnic population with its various 
needs. It is a necessary precondition for Kazakhstan future economic, social and political 
development. Such kind of ‘shared identity’ should bind ethnic groups together and at the 
same time provide cultural divergence.
1.1.3 Internal and External Dimensions o f  Instability
Many scholars emphasized the weaknesses of Central Asian states - such as 
declining standard of living, health, and education; the growing number of citizens living 
below the poverty line; ethnic and religious tensions; the complication of geographic 
remoteness from the developed world; and others, - which could become an internal 
source of instability. For example, given that Kazakhstan has approximately 6 million 
Ibid.
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ethnic Russians and more than 100 minority groups, the possibility of bloody nationalist 
separatist conflicts increases and could lead to instability, disorder and be unfavorable to 
the region for investments and trade relations.
Above-mentioned internal factors of instability, undoubtedly, worry Western 
countries, but the main concern presents possibility of nuclear proliferation in Central 
Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union strategic nuclear missiles were located in 
Kazakhstan making it control the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the w orld .H ence, the 
world attention was focused on the further politics of this country in respect of its nuclear 
possession. There were more than 1400 nuclear warheads on Kazakh territory and the 
large amount of nuclear materials.^^ And if Kazakhstan showed interest in possession of 
and control over nuclear weapons it would raise strong Western opposition, which could 
lead to sanctions against Kazakhstan. Nonetheless, this country decided to get rid of 
nuclear potential and to become a neutral power. Thus in December 1991 Kazakhstan 
signed the Almaty Declaration on Nuclear Weapons and became “the first state in history 
to complete unilateral voluntary disarmament.” Nonetheless, President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev “has insisted that Kazakhstan must be included in any discussions of the 
disposition of its weapons and that it must receive guarantees about its eventual security 
if it should relinquish these weapons -  given Kazakhstan’s location among nuclear 
neighbors in China, Russia, India and Pakistan.”^^
 ^ Bissenova Alima, “Nine years after independence, Kazakhstan’s Ambassador sees secure, prosperous 
future”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, vol. 19, issue 7, (August 2000).
Lubin, Nancy “Central Asia: Issues and Challenges for United States Policy”, in A. Banuazizi, M. 
Weiner (eds.). The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), p. 264.
Bissenova Alima, “Nine years after independence, Kazakhstan’s Ambassador sees secure, prosperous 
future”, (August 2000).
Graham E. Fuller, “Central Asia and American National Interests”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.). Central Asia: 
Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (1994), p. 136.
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If to talk about external factors of instability, firstly, surrounded by ‘hot-spots’ of 
the world, it is difficult to Kazakhstan to maintain successful development in such an 
unstable region. There are some threats to the Central Asian countries by a number of 
armed conflicts. Afghanistan is considered as the main source of instability especially 
after the offensive terror attack on September 11, civil strife in Tajikistan and Georgia 
and the conflict, which divides Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh have no 
final resolution yet. Plus war in Chechnya and instability in the Russian North Caucasus 
influence the development of pipeline routes.
Secondly, due to the fact that vast portions of northern Kazakhstan, and great 
portions of its industries and vital resources, are in areas populated overwhelmingly by 
Russians, there is a growing concern about secession in this region.^“* Today we are 
witnessing how some nationalists in Russia (like Alexander Solzhenitsyn) express the 
idea that “the whole of northern and northeastern Kazakhstan is in actual fact Southern 
Siberia, it is populated primarily by Russians, who are repressed in Kazakhstan today in 
their national, cultural, business and everyday activities’’^  ^ Though the Russian 
government tries to preserve status quo, some nationalists in Duma, like Zhirinovsky, are 
eager to exploit the Russian population factor to put heavier pressure on Central Asia.
Thirdly, regional powers, like Russia, are still trying to spread their influence on 
Central Asian states. After the breakup of the USSR, Moscow didn’t have coherent 
policy toward Central Asia. Russia was too preoccupied with developing its relations 
with the West. So Russia’s foreign-policy strategists left Central Asia on the periphery of
Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: in Search of Stability, 
(The Trilateral Commission, 2000), p. 26-27.
Graham Fuller, “The New Geopolitical Order”, in A. Banuazizi, M. Weiner (cds.). The New Geopolitics 
of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), p. 28.
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p .l8.
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Moscow’s attention. This passivity had created a geopolitical vacuum, which became a 
“green light” for other foreign countries to extend their influence in the region. Finally, 
realizing the danger of its decreasing stance in Central Asia, Russia tried to restore its ties 
with the five republics.^^
However, at the moment Russia lacks political thinkers capable to formulate 
concrete foreign policy while dealing with Central Asian question. Meanwhile, many 
attempts have been made to locate Central Asian issue within strategic system. For 
example, Vladimir Lukin, former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the USA, 
proposed intermediate solution: to build up “a multilevel system of relations with the 
states of the region depending on their importance for Russia”, in other words to create “a 
clear-cut system of reciprocal commitments between the big state and its smaller 
neighbours, which will receive security guarantees in exchange for the recognition of the 
special interests and influence of the ‘big neighbour’, in proportion to their geographical 
proximity and strategic and economic weight.”^^  Undoubtedly, Kazakhstan comes the 
first in this recourse owing to its proximity to Russia, the length of shared common 
borders, the number of Russians living in Kazakhstan and wide range of economic ties. 
However, one may well ask whether Kazakhstan does want to become again a country 
within the sphere of Russian influence. And if not, then how to avoid the possibility of 
ethnic clashes in Kazakhstan’s northern territories, and how to survive independently 
being surrounded by big powers, such as China and Russia?
26 B. Rumer, “The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts”, in A. Banuazizi, M. Weiner 
(eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), pp. 69-70.
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p.20.
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Concluding this section, it would be interesting to evaluate geopolitical domino
theory’s scenario of explosive instability, which is very real indeed, taking into account
the unstable nature of Central Asian region:
“The destabilization of Central Asia could come to include China, whose western 
provinces are still at times called “East Turkestan”; after all, the latter area is 
home to a significant Turkic minority of Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes, who 
have a long history of resistance to Beijing. No less vulnerable is Afghanistan, 
whose northern regions are populated by millions of Tajiks and Uzbeks, all 
contesting the dominance of Afghanistan by the Pashtuns. The Pashtun 
population of Pakistan, in turn, would hardly remain indifferent to a Tajik- 
Pashtun conflict in Afghanistan. India, given its fragile relations with both 
Pakistan and China, could also become embroiled. And of course destabilization 
in Central Asia would inevitably involve Russia, given its long-standing 
involvement in the region, its economic interests, and the presence there of ten 
million ethnic Russians.” *^
1.2 The Development of the US-Kazakhstan Relations
The emergence of new states on the ex-Soviet territory attracted attention of 
Western powers. Although the lack of information about and familiarity with the region’s 
peculiarities posed Western countries difficulties to formulate precise policy and to 
define their interests at stake in Central Asia. As national wisdom says: “You never know 
unless you try”. Thus, starting from 1991 Western powers intended to carry out their own 
‘investigation’ of ‘an exotic region’ - first embassies were established, first exchange 
programs were launched, first cooperation agreements were signed, in one word, 
independence of Central Asian states opened a door for both: the Western world, on the 
one hand, to discover a new place for enormous opportunities, and for Central Asian 
republics, on the other hand, to develop their internal stability, to increase the living
B. Rumer, “The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts”, in A. Banuazizi, M. Weiner 
(eds.). The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), pp. 69-70.
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standards and the quality of the state institutional structures under the guidance and 
financial help of Western partners, and to integrate smoothly into the world community.
President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev^^ once put the situation in the following
terms:
“The worst part o f  socialism  was that people didn’t have to think about anything: 
they just carried out orders. B ecause o f  the Iron Curtain no one traveled to the 
W est. . ..  W e are com ing out o f a tim e o f confrontation and cold  war. W e want to 
enter the democratic world like any other state. N ow  is the tim e for the W est to 
help us. . ..  W e also need basic help in carrying privatization and 
denationalization. Help us to b ecom e part o f  the world econom y. M ost o f  all, 
give us credits, so that w e can get on our feet. . ..  I am not just talking about
handouts. Invest and earn m oney!’,30
Kazakhstan is a world leader in natural resources, largely unexplored, offering 
investors tremendous potential; these include iron ore, chromites, coal, copper, 
aluminum, oil and gas. Kazakhstan has the largest oil reserves and “remains the largest 
oil producer throughout the period (with about 60% of its production from the Tengiz, 
Kashagan, and Karachaganak projects).”^^  Proven reserves are estimated between 6 and 9 
billion barrels.^^ For today, these natural blessings helped Kazakhstan to receive the 
third-highest level of US aid among other states of the former Soviet Union.
President Nazarbayev had his first official visit to the United States on 17-23 May 1992. See L. M. 
Ivatova, SShA vo Vneshnei Politike Respiibliki Kazakstan, (Almaty: “Steka”, 1999), p. 110-111.
Interview with President of the Republic o f Kazakhstan by Kohan John, “What are they waiting for?” 
Time, 6 April 1992.
The giant Tengiz field in Kazakhstan was the largest oil field discovered in the world since 1970s. 
Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: in Search of Stability, 
(2000), pp. 75-76.
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1.2.1 Early Stage Cooperation: de facto and de jure Recognition o f  the 
Republic o f  Kazakhstan
The United States was the first country to recognize officially the independence of 
Kazakhstan, on the 25th of December, 1991. The next day the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between two countries was announced^^. In February 1992, the 
United States opened its embassy in Almaty, the former capital of Kazakhstan. In May 
1992, Kazakhstan also opened its own diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C., at the 
time of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s first visit to the United States. 
During this visit five economic and political agreements were signed that laid the 
foundation of bilateral cooperation. This step was defined as an acknowledgement of 
mutual positions and interests.
Since that date, the US Congress included into its agenda the discussion of 
American policy toward Central Asian region. In July 1997 Senator Sam Brownback^'^ 
emphasized the growing Congressional interest in Central Asia, and stated that this 
region “is an area of vital political, economic and social importance to the United States 
and one on which US policy ought to focus immediately.”^^  It was October 1992, when 
the US Congress was working on the Freedom Support Act^^ (FSA) “to provide for a
Thus, diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and the US officially were established on 26 December 
1991. See N. Baigozhina, L. Erzhanova, V. Arkadyev, “Pravilo Pravoi Ruki”, Express-K, (25 December
2001), p. 1.
Chair of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
“Overview of US policy concerns”, CRS Reports to Congress for 1997, IB93108, p. 4.
^  However, an amendment Section 907 undermined the consistency o f the Act and came as a result of 
Congress lobbying by the representatives o f the US Armenian diaspora in response to Azerbaijan’s 
blockade of Armenia during their territorial conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
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wide range of US bilateral assistance and economic cooperation activities with the NIS to
help the states transform themselves into democracies and open markets.”
President Clinton declared in February 14, 1993, that:
“Kazakhstan’s size, geographic location ... its immense natural wealth ... its 
progress in promoting reforms and ... its strong leadership make it a very, very 
important country to us and a very important part of our future calculations.
[Thus] Almaty is critically important to our interests and to the future of 
democracy and stability in Central Asia.”^^
Then he added that the US and Kazakhstan “have established the basis for a long­
term partnership of immense strategic importance”, and gave his praise to Kazakhstan for 
its decision to become a non-nuclear state, asserting that “this historic step sets an 
example for the entire world at a pivotal time in international non-proliferation efforts.” 
The decision means the eventual elimination of more than 1000 nuclear warheads 
mounted on Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
William H. Courtney, as America’s first-ever ambassador to Kazakhstan, in 
August 20, 1992, shared his own perception of Kazakh nation: “They are a pragmatic 
people. They are interested in democracy and economic reform.”"^  ^ Later on, he added 
that:
“[America’s] main interest in Kazakhstan is to help the country develop a 
democracy, privatize its economy and help with its security. Privatization of the 
economy is the most important structural initiative for economic recovery [and]
Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 
1991”, Politique etmngere, February 2001, also online 
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htin.
Sullivan, Alexander, “Clinton sees long-term partnership with Kazakhstan”, USIA (US Information 
Agency) Wireless Files, (February 15, 1993), p. 6-7. See also “US will help Kazakhstan get Russian 
guarantees on pipeline”. Transcript: Clinton, Nazarbayev news conference, USIA (US Information Agency) 
Wireless Files, (16 February 1994), p. 6.
Sullivan, Alexander, “Clinton sees long-term partnership with Kazakhstan”, (February 15, 1993), p. 6-7.
Shevis, Jim, “US Aid a Factor in Kazakhstan’s Success”, USIA (US Information Agency) Wireless Files 
(November 3,1993), pp. 9-11.
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denuclearization is a vital step as Kazakhstan develops strong US and 
international support for the security and prosperity of the republic.”"^^
Kazakhstan from its side tried to foster good relations with the United States 
based on trust and mutual respect. President Nazarbayev expressed his view in a February 
14, 1994, speech sponsored by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) - a 
US government agency that encourages American trade and investment in developing 
countries:
“Our government realizes that our ultimate objectives cannot be attained without 
foreign investment -  in the first place American investment. ... the arrival of 
American private companies would give additional impetus to our economic 
transition.”"^^
This meeting was crucial in a sense of exchange of opinions between the two
countries and setting grounds for investment opportunities. During this event OPIC
President Ruth Harkin addressed to Nazarbayev and to American business circles saying:
“Kazakhstan is very important to the Clinton administration and to the United 
States, and we at OPIC will do all we can to further American investment in your 
nation. ... I want all the American executives to know here today that this is the 
right country, and the right man, and the right time for the beginning of a 
partnership that will take both countries into a prosperous 2V^ century.
Shevis, Jim, “Gore visit to Kazakhstan an important milestone” (Interview with US Ambassador 
Courtney), USIA (US Information Agency) Wireless Files, (December 14, 1993), p. 9.
Shevis, Jim, “Nazarbayev urges more US investment in Kazakhstan”, USIA (US Information Agency) 
Wireless Files, (February 15, 1994), p. 5-6.
43 Ibid.
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1.2.2 The Formulation o f US Foreign Policy toward Kazakhstan: Policies o f  
Different US Administrations
The US had no history of significant engagement with Central Asia - “remote and 
landlocked, it was ignored by Westerners exploring the world by sea.”'^ '* But the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the discovery of energy resources in the Caspian Sea changed the 
marginal position of the region for crafters of the US foreign policy.
Before formulating policy toward Central Asia, the United States policymakers 
should have answered the basic questions: Does this policy correctly understand the 
region and US interests there? Does it have the right set of programs and resources to 
support its aims? Is it sustainable for the US? Could Central Asia join Islamic movement 
of the Middle East, which threatens Western interests? Would Central Asian oil and gas 
resources be sufficient to cover the Western market demand and reduce Western energy 
dependence on the Persian Gulf countries? What could be the consequences of the 
possible transferring of nuclear weapons and weapons components under the control of a 
radical government or terrorists?
The United States had only “the vague idea of [Central Asia’s] geography, 
history, or political complexities.”'^  ^ Thus it failed to transform its ad hoc responses to 
regional challenges into a coherent strategy. Furthermore, the rationality and unity of
45
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 130.
Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 
1991”, (February 2001), also online
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroo t/views/articles/fbill/2001 polilique.htm.
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policy have been undermined because of the bureaucratic wrangling over jurisdictions 
and attempts by domestic interest groups to push their own regional agendas."*^
It was a US mistake to unify this region centered on the Caspian Sea. Not all the 
countries of this region are energy-rich or even Islamic. Their history, traditions and 
political approaches toward their neighbors are different. China, for example, is “crucial 
to the future of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but hardly worth a thought in the Caucasus, 
where Iran and Turkey are center-stage.”'*^ The common Soviet past is melting and the 
region is getting different geopolitical orientations (Russian, Chinese, Turkish, Iranian). 
So that, fist of all the US foreign policy crafters, while working out a coherent strategy 
and efficient policy toward Central Asian states, should try to avoid imposing a false 
unity on this region, and finally to draw up the precise and common understanding of the 
strategic interests and priorities, at the same time recognizing the historical vested
48interests of the neighboring powers in the region.
Coming to Kazakhstan in particular, the first problem for the US to overcome is 
the lack of domestic consensus -  a disagreement between the US 'oilers’, who are mostly 
interested in energy development and see the region in terms of the resources it can 
produce, and 'geopoliticians’, mostly concerned about geopolitics and see oil as an 
instrument for political ends. Another internal disagreement between US policymakers is 
based on the level of US involvement. The first group urged enhanced US aid for Central 
Asia in order to prevent political instability in the region which “can produce spillover
Ibid.
Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: in Search of Stability, 
(2000), p. 32.
Ibid.
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effects in important nearby states, including US allies and friends such as Turkey. 
Moreover, though Kazakhstan removed nuclear weapons from its territory, “the presence 
of nuclear weapons-related materials and facilities and other elements of the nuclear fuel 
cycle in the region raises the danger of proliferation to radical Third World regimes or 
terrorist organization.” ®^ Thus only the US is in the strongest position to prevent such 
proliferation and influence democratization.
Another group puts ahead opposite arguments and objects to US involvement into 
Central Asia, criticizing “aid for democratization among cultures they view as historically 
attuned to authoritarianism.” '^ They urge to reduce aid supplies to these governments, 
“arguing that by providing aid, the United States tacitly supports these [repressive] 
regimes, and may even unwittingly encourage a countervailing rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism as the only channel of dissent.” As far as the oil and natural resources 
in Central Asia concerned, their full development is doubtful and for many years they are 
not going to be available to Western markets. Moreover, the regional instability and the 
high possibility of civil and ethnic conflicts could “place US personnel and citizens in 
danger.”^^
Bush Administration was the first to start engagement in the region, but it was 
only on the level of de facto and de jure recognition of Kazakhstan without truly deep 
involvement ‘on the grounds’. During the first years of Clinton Administration, the main 
US focus was Russia in the NIS. However, it didn’t stop US investors and businessmen *•
49 Overview of US policy concerns”, CRS Reports for 1997, IB93108, p. 2, also sec Jim Nichol, “Central 
Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, CRS Report to Congress, (30 August, 1999), p. 
17, online source http://www.fpc.gov/crsccnas.htm.
'"Ibid.
"  Ibid.
• Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid.53
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to start cooperation with Kazakhstani partners. Starting from 1993, first oil contracts were 
signed and it became a new landmark in bilateral collaboration. Meanwhile, in the 
absence of strong direction from the center on policy priorities, US departments started 
pursuing their own narrow institutional policies. In 1995, for example, “the Department 
of Commerce created its own ombudsman for energy and commercial cooperation with 
the NIS to promote the activities of US companies in the Caspian.” '^'
Central Asian region gained more precise attention during the second Clinton 
Administration when it became apparent that without strengthening and stabilizing these 
states it would be impossible to succeed in development of Caspian natural resources. 
Transformation of the region itself and the international system around it was needed. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed the US role as twofold: “to preserve the independence of 
the new states and to maximize the opportunities for their inclusion in the world 
economic system and in some rudimentary structure of international security”^^
American interests evolved gradually in the region. Some scholars tried to 
identify and to classify them. For example, Graham Fuller divided US interests in Central 
Asia on ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ in nature: the former included the avoidance of 
reemergence of any kind of Russian radical and ideological expansionism, which could 
re-create global nuclear confrontation; prevention of further civil war and break up of 
nations which would influence neighboring states and fill the world with disorder; 
avoidance of nuclear proliferation·, preventing the emergence of radical anti-western 
Islamism; - and the latter focused on assistance in establishing democracy, human rights,
Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 
1991”, (February 2001), also online
http;//www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/200l politique.htm.
The Cyber-Caravan, (25 January 1999). It is an online publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute 
in Washington, D.C., www.cacianalyst.org.
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free market economics and clean environment, support in the economic development of
Central Asian states, firstly its raw materials.
In 1996-1997 there were four general objectives for the US policy in Central Asia,
such as strengthening political and economic reform; bolstering energy security;
enhancing commercial opportunities for US companies; mitigating regional conflicts^^.
Taking into consideration the high potential for instability in Central Asia, especially in
Kazakhstan with its multi-ethnic population, the US understands how crucial is it to
identify ethnic conflict on its early stage, in order to avoid the bloodshed, the loss of
thousands of lives and the increase in refugee flows. But at the same time, “US has
luxury of distance”, while ethnic borders and inter-state politics dictate another reality.
In this recourse we should not forget about Russian influence on Kazakhstan.
Russia’s reaction on the growing US involvement into Central Asian region, and in
Kazakhstan in particular, was relatively negative. Russia and other neighboring countries
saw US support as an attempt to carry out its ambitious and hegemonic policy excluding
traditional actors. Sergei Kazyonnov, an expert with the independent Institute of National
Security Research in Moscow, interestingly commented it:
“It looks as though the Americans are set to stay in Central Asia. ... There is a 
growing feeling here that the US is using the tragedy of Sept. 11 not only to 
punish the terrorists, but also to extend its own influence.”^^
^  Elizabeth Jones has broadened these four objectives adding new ones: to prevent the spread o f terrorism, 
drug trafficking and arms smuggling. See Elizabeth Jones, “O Politike Soedinennih Shtatov v Tzentralnoi 
Asii”, Vreinya Po, (21 December 2001), p.l.
Weir Fred, “Russia Wary of Postwar US Goals”, Christian Science Monitor, 08827729, 12/10/2001, vol. 
94, issue 12.
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CHAPTER II. THE GOALS AND INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
KAZAKHSTAN
US foreign policy-makers while dealing with international issues try to 
differentiate between three different categories of interests: vital national interests which 
concentrate on America’s physical security and standard of living; prosperity and security 
of a nation’s key friends, trading partners; and a broad range of strategic, economic, and
• 58humamtanan interests.
In 1996 The Commission on America’s National Interests identified five vital 
national interests: to avert attacks with weapons of mass destruction on the United States; 
to prevent the appearance of hostile powers in Europe, Asia or on US borders; to avoid 
the break down of the global systems for trade, financial markets, energy supplies, and 
the environment, and to ensure the survival of US allies.^^
If it were possible to project these US objectives on the Central Asian region then 
it would be clear that the United States sees not only investment opportunities, 
particularly in the energy sector, but also the importance to prevent negative development 
in the region affecting other, more critical American interests.^*  ^Thus the US has ‘multi­
level’ set of interests in Kazakhstan based on: geopolitical factor -  ensuring the US 
presence in the region where interests of power-rivals (such as Russia, China, and Iran) 
cross with each other; cultural and ideological factor -  promotion of humanitarian
* Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 134.
Ibid. See K. K. Tokayev, Pod Styagom Nezavisimosti: Ocherki o Vneshnei Politike Kazakhstana, 
(Almaty: Bilim, 1997), p. 371. See also L. M. Ivatova, SShA vo Vneshnei Politike Respubliki Kazahstan, 
(1999), p. 76.
Graham Fuller, “Central Asia and the World”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the 
World, (1993), p. 126.
26
values, such as democracy, freedom and human rights, market economy; prevention o f 
regional threats, such as nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, religious 
extremism, -  which put in danger not only US regional allies’ interests but also the US 
interests as well; also prevention o f economic crisis (through economic humanitarian 
help), which could transcend national borders and spread destabilization in other states.^' 
After the Soviet Union ceased to exist three key players -  Russia, China, and the 
United States -  tried to achieve a provisional power equilibrium in Central Asia: Russia -  
continued its traditional dominance in its former Southern provinces; China - gradually 
increased its own political influence, while developing its economic relations with the 
Central Asian countries and seeking to avoid confrontation with Moscow; the United 
States, despite its preoccupation with other areas of greater strategic significance, kept a 
wary eye on the region.^^ However, the 11* of September transferred Central Asia into 
the epicenter of geopolitical shocks on a global scale redefining the geopolitical situation 
surrounding Central Asia. The alignment of power has altered and the United States
became the region’s main economic donor and security manager. 63
2.1 Strengthening Society and Internal Stability in Kazakhstan
The United States while dealing with the Central Asian fundamental problems 
undertook ambitious actions, trying to intensify efforts to help these states to become 
stable, prosperous and equal members of the world community, which could be achieved 
through reforms in political, economic, and societal spheres. In accordance with US
K. K. Tokayev, Diplomatiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, (Astana: Elorda, 2001), pp. 200-201. 
“  Boris Rumcr, “The Powers in Central Asia”, Survival, vol. 44, n.3, (Autumn 2002), p. 57. 
“ Ibid.
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understanding true security, stability and prosperity for Central Asian countries were 
linked to democratic and economic reforms, rule of law, respect for human rights, and a 
willingness to cooperate on regional and international levels.^
In other words, Americans back-up the idea of democratic government that 
respects human rights, allows open political dialogue, maintains free market economy 
and cares about environment, because these ideals could help to promote healthy and
stable society.'65
2.1.1 Democratization and Human Rights Policy
It was not until 1945, that the human rights discourse, as an attribute of 
democracy, finally became very popular among states. The United States pioneered the 
debates about morality and the national interest. Some argue that the Truman 
administration was the first to raise human rights issues after World War II and the 
Eisenhower administration, despite congressional pressures, tried to continue that 
leadership role.^^ American adherence to democracy has strengthened with the time. The 
Clinton Administration has declared that the obsolete containment doctrine should be
B. Lynn Pascoc, “Security, Stability, Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line Affairs”, Remarks 
delivered at International Conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus Yale Center for the Study of 
Globalization, New Haven, Connecticut, September 20, 2002, see also online 
http://www.state.gOv/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639.htm.
Graham E. Fuller, “Central Asia and American National Interests”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.). Central Asia: 
Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (1994), p. 139.
^  David Forsythe, “Human Rights Policy: Change and Continuity”, in Randall Ripley and James Lindsay 
(cds.), US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, (University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1997), p. 259.
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replaced with an enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies that 
rarely go to war against one another.
Though democratic principles are considered to be highly moral and to some 
extent altruistic not all scholars share this perception. For example, American scholars, 
like Noam Chomsky, David Forsythe, have asserted that only “smaller, weaker, and 
poorer states became laboratories for efforts to link US foreign policy to human rights 
performance”, though states which are more powerful and strategically important were 
able to avoid human rights pressures.^^ The aim of democracy for American leaders in 
such cases was to produce “governments that supported American policies, [otherwise] 
they have sought to subvert democracy.”^^
The other side of the critique was based on the fact that the level of decline in 
American society was not the best example of democracy for other states. At home the 
US had to deal with the highest rates of illiteracy, malnutrition, infant mortality, violent 
crime, homelessness, imprisonment, and poverty. Moreover, America was hobbled by 
debt, weakened by fears of its population for personal safety, suspicious of its leaders, 
and increasingly divided between the skilled and the unskilled, the jobholders and the 
unemployable.^” Is it the lesson on democracy the United States could offer other states 
when it seems that democracy is not working in this country.’ '
Ronald Steel, “The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy”, in Eugene Wittkopf and James McCormick (eds.), 
The Domestic Sources o f American Foreign Policy, (Rowman & Little Field Publishers, Inc., 1999), p. 26.
David Forsythe, “Human Rights Policy: Change and Continuity”, in Randall Ripley and James Lindsay 
(eds.), US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, (1997), p. 274. See also Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam 
Really Wants, (Odonian Press, Arizona, 1997), pp. 21-25.
Stephen Van Evera, “American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better”, in Charles W. 
Kegley, Eugene Wittkopf (cds.). The Future of American Foreign Policy, (1992), p. 289.
™ Ronald Steel, “The Domestic Core of Foreign Policy”, in Eugene Wittkopf and James McCormick (eds.). 
The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, (1999), p. 24.
Ibid., p. 25.
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Nevertheless, it became popular and politically attractive to speak out about
human rights abuses abroad^^ Thus while in his office, Bill Clinton had a reputation of a
classic, pragmatic American politician -  certainly as far as human rights are concerned.
He used rhetoric of human rights in campaigning against Bush, whom he criticized for
insufficient attention to human rights.^^ But when he faced with concrete situation,
namely human rights situation in China "^ ,^ he backed out. Nevertheless, later expansion of
democracy abroad became one of the three basic pillars of Clinton foreign policy.
As a result, in case of Central Asia, Steve Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large for
the Newly Independent States, aptly noted in March 17, 1999:
“the overarching goal of US policy in Central Asia is to secure the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of the states of the region. ... This goal is 
pursued by advocating democratization, adherence to international human rights 
standards, free markets, cooperation within the region, conflict resolution, and 
responsible security policies.”^^
However, being under the Soviet rule for at least seven decades, for the Central 
Asian states the very newness of democracy itself was a major obstacle to the process of 
democratization, because they were ill prepared for the challenge of modem statehood.^^ 
Kazakhs have never experienced democracy before: political hierarchies with khans, 
tsars, and Communist Party Secretaries at the top of power, and clan elders, imperial
Randall Ripley and James Lindsay, “Continuity and Change after the Cold War”, in Randall Ripley and 
James Lindsay (eds.), US Foreign Policy After The Cold War^  (1997), p. 316.
David Forsythe, “Human Rights Policy: Change and Continuity”, in Randall Ripley and James Lindsay 
(eds.), US Foreign Policy After The Cold War, (1997), p. 275.
Ibid., p. 276. To be more precise on this situation -  the Clinton administration engaged in a high-profile 
dialogue on human rights, against the background of a possible loss o f MFN status for China. But in the 
last analysis, the Clinton administration continued MFN status. China was crucial as a market; and its 
regional and global political role was too important for Clinton to sacrifice it on the altar of human rights.
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30, 1999), p. 14, also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm.
“A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, an address by Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Central Asian Institute, John Hopkins School of Advanced International 
Studies, (July 21, 1997), p. 23.
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governors, and obkom functionaries towards the bottom hindered the development of 
mass political participation/^
Hence, in Kazakhstan the major obstacle for democracy development was the 
novelty of democracy itself/® Many observers predicted the republic’s multi-ethnicity 
would impair, if not make wholly impossible, the development of an independent 
democratic state/^ However, Kazakhstan has managed to avoid the dangerous outcomes 
of its potentially divisive ethnic diversity during all years of independent existence. And 
from the US part, instead of being more tolerant toward such a huge ‘experiment with 
democracy’, the US government started criticizing Kazakhstan for each mistake. For 
example, during Olbrait’s official visit to Central Asian republics, she has heavily 
criticized them on human rights issue. President Nazarbayev, from his part, harshly 
expressed his opinion addressing her critique. He said that Kazakhstan couldn’t compete 
with America and its ‘centuries-created’ history, while older population still remembers 
the time when Asians in America were forbidden to complaint, women earned less salary 
than men did, and where in 1970 Martin Luther King was killed for his speech against 
racial discrimination. Nazarbayev emphasized that Kazakhstan was only 9 years old, and 
it is not going to admit any critique of its state policy and to tolerate any interference into 
domestic affairs of the country overshadowed by rhetoric on democracy .
Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, “The Trouble with Democracy in Kazakhstan”, Central Asian Survey, voL 
15, n.2, March, 1996, p. 179.
Martha Brill Olcott, “Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan”, in Karen 
Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.). Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 210. See also Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, “The Trouble with 
Democracy in Kazakhstan”, (March, 1996), p. 179.
Martha Brill Olcott, “Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan”, in Karen 
Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.). Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
(1997), p.212.
G. Imamniyazova, “Prototip Amerikanskoi Mechti”, Express-K, (8 December 2001), p. 1.
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Nevertheless, it is difficult to Kazakhstan to act on its own. Consequently, the 
United States has a vital role in helping Kazakhstan to establish and promote the new 
venture -  ‘democracy’ on its grounds. And if US policy fails to achieve its principal goals 
of integration and democratization and fails to provide internal or external security, then
Central Asia would stop being a peripheral region in US strategy, 81
2,1.2 Elimination o f  “Islamic extremism’*
Given that Islam arrived very late in nomadic Kazakhstan, approximately in the 
early nineteenth century, it only weakly impressed itself upon this society and was 
moderate in its expression. Kazakhs were converted to Islam “under the dual pressure 
of wandering Tatar clerics, often of the Sufi ilk, and colonizing Russians, who perceived 
Islam as a cementing force for the disparate nomadic tribes, thus making them easy to 
control”*^ . Kazakh intellectuals used to examine the connection between Islam and 
Kazakh culture, and between the Sharia, Islamic law, and the Adat, customary law, which 
had developed over the centuries among the predominantly nomadic Kazakhs.*“* They 
argued about superficiality in their conversion to Islam, when after formal conversion the 
community “had maintained strong pagan beliefs and practices and, being nomadic, had 
failed to get into the habit of praying regularly at mosques, which were few and far
Stephen Blank, “The United States and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.), Central 
Asian Security: The New International Context, (Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 2001), p. 146.
Graham Fuller, “Central Asia and the World”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the 
World, (\993), p. 117-118.
Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, (Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1995).
Ibid.
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between in pasturelands” These moderate Islamic traditions hampered the possibility 
of revolutionary Islam to evolve in this region to the fullest extent.
Hence, Central Asian states were not predisposed to Islamic fundamentalism 
because of the following factors: 98 percent of Central Asia’s Muslims are Sunnis, not 
Shi’ite; in Pre-Soviet Central Asian societies Islam never occupied as significant place as 
it did in neighboring regions; the political elites in the Central Asian states favored the 
concept of a secular state*^, so that Central Asian political culture could be defined as 
Islamic only to a certain extent . In other words, the fears that Islam has potential to 
obstruct democratic development in Central Asia were not justified in the case of
00
Kazakhstan, where fundamentalism is largely absent.
Talking about political Islam, an interesting interpretation was given by 
Zviagelskaia, who described it as a social movement, arising in societies with an 
increased process of marginalization, where the formation of a middle class is slow and 
the gap between poor and rich grows instantly. However this interpretation does not 
give the full understanding and dimension of a regime based on Islam, which 
differentiates from the other religions by its integral nature. Islam envisages total control
over all political, economic, social and cultural aspects of life within the Moslem state.90
Ibid., p. 109. Those Kazakh intellectuals who maintained that Islamic practices should reflect Kazakh 
culture also preferred the use of the Adat to the Sharia in Kazakh courts. They included Ali Khan 
Bukeikhanov, the head of Alash Orda, the leading Kazakh nationalist party. ‘Kazakhs are non-Muslims or 
at very most half-Muslims,’ he said.”
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), pp. 135-136.
Dmitry Trofimov, Islam in the Political Culture of the Former Soviet Union: Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan, (Hamburger Beitrage, 1995), p. 44.
For centuries, Kazakhs maintained their own folk spiritual rituals, merely incorporating minor elements 
of Islam into their traditional practices.
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), pp. 12-13.
Dmitry Trofimov, Islam in the Political Culture of the Former Soviet Union: Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan, (1995), p. 12. See also Graham Fuller, ‘The Future of Political Islam”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, 
n. 2, (March/April 2002), p. 49. After the September 11 terrorist attack President Bush has repeatedly
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thus making it incompatible with democracy (with rare excep t ions )A nd  as soon as 
Central Asian states gave preference to democratic development they could hardly 
combine it with Islamic radicalism. Thus, today Kazakhstan follows double principle o f 
non-interference -  by a state into religious activities, and by religion into direct state 
govemance.^^
The Islamic political movement did not exist in the USSR prior perestroika^^. 
Under the Soviet system the Muslim Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) 
was the main authority of all Islamic clergy in Central Asia and was situated in 
Tashkent^^, which assumed a special role of Uzbekistan’s Soviet political elite at the 
regional level. Being suspicious about the possibility of interference in Kazakhstan’s 
internal affairs by politicians from abroad, the Kazakh leaders took a decision to 
withdraw from SADUM and to set up a separate Muftiyat on January 12, 1990, headed 
by Ratbek Nasynbai-Oly.^^
stressed that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam. But by seeking to separate Islam from politics, the 
West ignores the reality that the two are intricately interlined across a broad swath of the globe from 
northern Africa to Southeast Asia. Thus political Islam, or Islamism -  defined broadly as the belief that the 
Koran and the Hadith (Traditions of the Prophet’s life) have something important to say about the way 
society and governance should be ordered -  remains the most powerful ideological force in that part of the 
world.
Ibid., p. 13. In the case of democracy, the state system is subordinated to the laws of the state ( ‘rule of 
law’). As for Islamic tradition, it usually accepts such subordination under the condition that the party in 
power corresponds with Shari’a requirements.
N.A. Nazarbayev, Kriticheskoe desyatiletie, (Almaty: Atamura, 2003), p. 97.
See also A. Malashenko, “Islam and Politics in the Southern Zone of the Former USSR”, in V. Naumkin 
(ed.). Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict, (Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 114. At the 
outset of Gorbachev’s perestroika, the USSR had four Muslim religious boards, all fully controlled by the 
official authorities: the Religious Board of Muslims of the European part of Russia and Siberia (DUMES), 
the Religious Board of Transcaucasian Muslims (DUMZAK), the Religious Board of Muslims of the 
Northern Caucasus (DUMSK), and the Religious Board of Muslims o f Central Asia (SADUM).
Grigory Bondarevsky and Peter Ferdinand, “Russian Foreign policy in Central Asia”, in Peter Ferdinand 
(ed.). The New Central Asia and Its Neighbours, (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Printer 
Publishers: London, 1994), p. 43.
Dmitry Trofimov, Islam in the Political Culture of the Former Soviet Union: Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan, (1995), pp. 27-28. Moreover, in 1991 an Islamic Institute was opened in Alma-Ata symbolizing 
independence from Tashkent.
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In the early 1990s, Central Asian republics initiated a search for new guiding 
lights in foreign policy. Thus they turned to the Muslim countries, being fascinated with 
romantic ideas of Islamic solidarity and expecting help to overcome the economic crisis. 
However Muslim countries were caught unprepared by the sudden disappearance of the 
USSR and the unexpected entry of several new states into the Muslim world. By the mid- 
1990s the aspirations of Central Asian states cooled down. Surely, independence has 
brought an upsurge of religious interest in Kazakhstan, though it could hardly be a 
unifying social force or catalyst for mass political action manifesting itself only as a 
return to traditional religious practices and morality
However, the leaders in Kazakhstan, favoring a secular state system, are still 
cautious about political Islam and see fundamentalists as potential dangerous competitors 
in the struggle for power. After the demise of the communist regime, there was a lack of 
democratic traditions in society accompanied by worsening standards of living, so the 
ideology of fundamentalism, which upheld the ideas of Islamic state and ‘Islamic 
economy’ based on the principles of social justice, became attractive to the masses.^^ 
President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev, during his first visit to a European country, Austria, 
declared that Kazakhstan had ‘a special responsibility’, along with Russia, to keep other 
Central Asian states away from Islamic fundamentalism and Iranian influence.^* For 
Nazarbayev Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ presented one of the gravest threats that his young 
state might face. The choice made by Central Asia’s new states to follow the secular state 
model was supported by Russia, European states, and the US.
Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, “The Trouble with Democracy in Kazakhstan”, (1996), p. 194.
A. Malashenko, “Islam and Politics in the Southern Zone o f the Former USSR”, in V. Naumkin (ed.). 
Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict, (1994), p. 113.
Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, (1995), p. 121.
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Today, Central Asian states are no longer as isolated as they were during the 
Soviet era. Improved communication networks and information technologies are 
broadening horizons, particularly for the younger generation. The number of foreign 
businessmen and professionals who work in the Central Asian states on a long-term basis 
is increasing. Moreover, a large number of faiths and denominations is growing in the 
region.^^ For example, there are 40 religious confessions in Kazakhstan, uniting 
approximately three thousand religious organizations and m ovem ents .Thus ,  all these 
factors foster new thinking and increase the variety of views in the society. And probably 
the right time came to re-evaluate the role of religion in the world.
2.1.3 Political and Economic Reforms
Understanding the first frustration of Central Asian states after gaining their 
independence, the US encouraged them to move towards market economies and
democratization.** '^ As Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador to the CIS, acknowledged,
102America’s highest goal is to create and sustain democratic political institutions.
Furthering this point Mr. Talbott in his famous 1997 speech emphasized also the
importance of political and economic reforms in Central Asia:
“If reforms in the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia continues and 
ultimately succeeds, it will encourage similar progress in the other newly 
independent states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia and Ukraine. It
Shirin Akiner, “Religion’s Gap: Islam and Central Asia in the 1990s”, Harvard International Review, 
vol. XXII, no.l, (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 65.
N.A. Nazarbayev, Kriticheskoe desyatiletie, (2003), p. 99.
Stephen Blank, “The United States and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central 
Asian Security: The New International Context, (2001), p. 128.
Franck Csongos, “Central Asia: Official Outlines US Policy”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
RFE/RL Newsline, (18 March 1999), cited by Stephen Blank, “TTie United States and Central Asia”, in 
Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: the New International Context, (2001), p. 128.
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will contribute to stability in a strategically vital region that borders China, 
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, and that has growing economic and social ties 
with Pakistan and India. The consolidation of free societies, at peace with 
themselves and each other, stretching from the Black Sea to the Pamir mountains, 
will open up a valuable trade and transport corridor along the old Silk Road, 
between Europe and Asia. [On the other hand] ... if economic and political 
reform ... does not succeed, if internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and 
flare, the region could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of 
religious and political extremism, and a battleground for outright war. It would 
matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen in an area that sits 
on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil.‘^ ”^
Understanding the vitality of political reforms Kazakhstan attempts to create true 
democracy based on: multi-party system, balance of power, pluralism, equal 
opportunities without discrimination on sex or race basis, and rule of law, which 
presupposes competent Parliament formation and improvement of existing legal base. 
Today Kazakhstan’s political system is characterized by a strong presidential rule. The 
strengthening of executive power in the current conditions in Kazakhstan has provided 
reliable guarantees for the continuation of the policy of r e f o r m s . I n  other words, a 
young state needed strong leadership in order to avoid internal chaos and exhausting 
struggle for power, which could lead to inevitable inter-ethnic conflict and could tear the 
country apart. Many consider the acting President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, as a real 
advantage of the country. The main credit he deserves for his ability, as a President, to 
keep a potentially explosive situation well within manageable limits*^ .^ Kazakhstan, 
despite the country’s unusual demographic mix, surprisingly has been among the most
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia ”, Address at the John Hopkins School of Advanced Applied Studies, Washington, DC, 
(21 July 1997), cited by Stephen Blank, “The United States and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena 
Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: the New International Context, (2001), p. 130.
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p .l7.
Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asians New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, 
(United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 83.
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stable of the Soviet successor states. This stability has encouraged foreign investment in
Kazakhstan. 106
In the sphere of economic reforms, there were several shortcomings to overcome. 
Firstly, the collapse of the Soviet interdependent economic system has severely disrupted 
long-established economic relationships that cannot be easily restored.'”’ Secondly, 
Kazakhstan’s main geopolitical disadvantage is the absence of a direct access to the open 
seas, so all exported products should pass over at least one other state before arriving at 
ports. This became a big obstacle for Kazakhstan in attempting to establish an 
independent economic policy. Thirdly, given that Kazakhstan specializes mostly on the 
sale of raw materials, this strong reliance on energy resources has led to some negative 
consequences such as an overly optimistic estimation of the future income from the 
energy sector, which have turned government’s attention away from other key economic 
sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, and have failed to develop a reliable tax 
collection system.'”” Ironically, the modest rent income that Kazakhstan will earn, “even 
with a slight upward trend in world oil prices, is far less than would be achieved through 
improved tax collection.”" ” At the moment Kazakhstan undertakes special measures to 
work out the afore-mentioned problems strengthening tax legal system and developing 
each economic sector.
Ibid., p. 85. Kazakhstan was the first o f the CIS states to pass laws on foreign investment, including laws 
permitting the repatriation of profits.
Graham Fuller, “Central Asia and the World”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.^, Central Asia and the 
World, (1993), p. 107.
Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, 
(1996), p.81.
Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs o f Short-Term Gains”, in Robert Ebel and 
Rajan Menon (eds.). Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and Caucasus, (Rowman & LittleField 
Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 79.
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Economic reforms aimed at transition to market economy provided Kazakhstan 
with the new currency -  tenge, two-level banking system, price liberalization, adoption of 
free exchange rates, free flow of capital and other attributes of market economy. 
However, the special attention deserves the privatization process in Kazakhstan. While 
most such states jealously guard their natural resources through full state ownership and 
control, Kazakhstan rapidly privatized the bulk of its energy sector and let an 
unprecedented level of direct international participation in the development, production, 
and export of its energy reserves.'** This precedent generated some serious social, 
political, and economic consequences: such as, a strong dependence on foreign 
companies to improve socioeconomic conditions at the regional and local level, harsh 
elite competition over the additional resources these foreign companies can provide, the 
undervaluing of Kazakhstan’s natural resources'*^. Of course, privatization achieved also 
positive results: it diffused popular discontent and attracted the attention of foreign 
investors and governments; secured aid from international development agencies such as 
the Agency for International Development and the European Union’s TACIS program , 
which provides financing for projects that promote market economies and democratic 
societies in the former Soviet Union and Mongolia; and lending institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction
P. J. Luong and E. Weinthal, “Domestic Determinants of the International Role in Oil and Gas 
Development: The Case of Central Asia,” unpublished paper, January 1999, cited by Pauline Jones Luong, 
“Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains”, in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon (eds.), Energy 
and Conflict in Central Asia and Caucasus, (2000), pp. 79-80.
Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains”, in Robert Ebel and 
Rajan Menon (eds.). Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and Caucasus, (2000), p. 80.
During 1992 -  1998 EU-level grant assistance totaled about 860 million ecus. In the TACIS framework, 
two well-known programs are the INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) and TRACECA 
(Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia) projects. See also Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander 
Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The new Central Asia: in search of Stability, (2000), p. 57.
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and Development"'^; filled the budgetary gap once Moscow stopped transferring 
resources to Kazakhstan, provided much needed capital and socioeconomic investment, 
and supported further democratic reforms.'
Today Kazakhstan moves toward market economy through a plan for 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural microeconomic reform that will promote 
economic recovery, market development, and growth. This plan will be developed in 
cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and other International financial 
institutions. '
Highly appreciating foreign assistance, Kazakhstan ranks good relations with the 
United States high among its foreign policy successes"^. Three core agreements were 
signed between the leaders of Kazakhstan and the United States, so that they constitute 
the basic framework of bilateral economic relationship: Agreement on Trade Relations, 
which confers most-favored-nation treatment on Kazakhstan and permits it to export 
goods to the US while receiving non-discriminatory treatment; an Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) agreement to make available insurance for American 
firms operating in Kazakhstan"^; and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that provides 
legal protections and assurances for investors of one country in the territory of the other
'''' In 1998 the EBRD had disbursed about 450 million ecus to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and committed 
700 million more.
“Republic o f Kazakhsta: Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff Country Report, no. 98/84, 
August 1998, cited by Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs o f Short-Term Gains”, in 
Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon (eds.). Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and Caucasus, (2000), p. 80. 
Due to these policies, Kazakhstan was also able to achieve some positive results from 1996 to 1998, 
including macroeconomic stabilization, a significant decline in inflation, and a modest growth in GDP.
116 “uS-Kazakhstan Relations”, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 10517693, 5/25/92, vol. 3, issue 21, p. 
402.
' ’’ Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, 
(1996), p.83.
This agreement will provide investment insurance, project financing, and investor services for US 
private investors in Kazakhstan.
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country. These agreements presented a strong legal basis for bilateral economic 
cooperation and helped to increase the confidence of foreign investors and businessmen 
in dealing with the region. At the same time, Clinton assured that the increase in aid to 
Kazakhstan is not aimed to gain preferential treatment for US businesses; rather, he said, 
it is recognition of Almaty’s reform to move its economy from communism to a free 
market. Summing all above-mentioned, US- Kazakhstan bilateral cooperation is
191playing a key role in developing economic and political reform policy packages.
2.1.4 Central Asian Regional Arrangements and US Encouragement o f  the 
Kazakhstani Membership in International Organizations
By the mid-1990s. Central Asian states realized the importance of closer 
economic and security cooperation among them in order to preserve their sovereignty.’^  ^
The creation of several regional organizations -  such as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS); Partnership for Peace (PfP); Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Pact; The Shanghai Forum; Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova Group (GUAM); 
and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) -  pioneered the collaboration on the
“US-Kazakhstan Relations”, (25 May, 1992), p. 402.
“US will help Kazakhstan get Russian guarantees on pipeline”. Transcript: Clinton, Nazarbayev news 
conference, USIA (US Information Agency) Wireless Files, (16 February 1994), p. 2.
Ariel Cohen, “Paving the Silk Road: US Interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, Harvard 
International Review, vol. XXII, no.l, (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 74.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
(Basic Books, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), pp. 146-147.
Four republics became full members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in February 
1992, whilst the fifth, Kazakhstan, became a temporary associate member. See Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline 
Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region”, International Studies Perspectives, vol. 3, issue 3, 
(August 2002), p. 314.
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regional level. Moreover, Customs u n i o n C e n t r a l  Asian Economic Community 
(CAEC)'^^ and Centrazbat’^  ^could be added to the list of regional initiatives. In October 
2000, a grandly entitled Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) replaced the failed 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The new 
treaty signed by these five countries envisaged inter alia ‘ensuring economic security on 
the outer border of the community’ and ‘forming a common energy market’.'^’
Another significant regional initiative is the Shanghai Five. It was established in 
1996 and comprised China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The main 
goal was to resolve border disputes among the signatories and to reduce the armed forces 
along their borders. Later, the group’s aims transferred into combating Islamic extremism 
and the drug business. On 15 June 2001 the presidents of all five countries plus 
Uzbekistan signed a declaration establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and the Shanghai Convention to struggle against terrorism, separatism and
• 129extremism.
Apart from regional cooperation Central Asian states were able to establish 
diplomatic links with numerous foreign powers in a very short period of time. For 
example, Kazakhstan established diplomatic relations with over 40 states in seven
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, August 30, 1999, p. 10, 
also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm.
CAEC consists o f an executive committee o f heads of state and government. Council of Foreign 
Ministers, Centrazbat, and a Central Asian Bank.
Centrazbat, formed in 1995 under UN auspices, became a source for standby peacekeepers and fostered 
cooperation among regional states and training ties to the UN and NATO.
Text of statement setting up the Eurasian Economic Community, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), (10 October 
2000), cited by Roy Allison, “Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy and Cooperation in Central 
Asia” in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: The New International Context., 
(2001), p. 227.
Boris Rumer, “The Powers in Central Asia”, (Autumn 2002), p. 61.
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months. Today it has diplomatic relations with 105 foreign co u n t r ie sM o reo v e r ,  
Kazakhstan became a member of the following international organizations: the United 
Nations organizations, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the NATO 
Partnership for Peace program. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). The wide range of participation in these organizations showed Kazakhstan’s 
desire to balance the influence of different political and regional groupings.
The UN and OSCE membership was particularly important for Kazakhstan: it 
ensured that regional security issues related to potential conflicts could be addressed in 
these significant international forums and the norm of the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
was likely to be taken more seriously. Kazakhstan was admitted to the United Nations 
among eight former republics of the Soviet Union on 2 March 1992. And from the first 
days of its membership Kazakhstan was known in the UN “for the unprecedented closure 
of the nuclear test site and voluntary renunciation of its world’s fourth biggest nuclear 
potential, its real contribution to consolidation of the regional stability and security, and 
its timely financial contributions to the UN despite its own difficulties.” The United 
Nations, from its part, is a guarantor of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty helping it to become 
part of the world economy and gain access to international markets.
G. S. Sapargaliev (ed.), Osnovi Gosudarstva I Prava Respubliki Kazakstan, (Almaty: “Zheti Zhargi”, 
1997), p. 427.
Shirin Akincr, “Emerging Political Order in the New Caspian States: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan”, in G. Bertsch, C. Craft, S. Jones, and M. Beck (eds.). Crossroads and Conflict: Security 
and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (2000), p. 129.
Roy Allison, “Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy and Cooperation in Central Asia”, in Roy 
Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: The New International Context, (2001), p. 238.
Arystanbekova, “Kazakhstan: Ten Years in the United Nations”, International Affairs, vol. 48, n. 4, 
(2002), p. 153.
Ibid. In Kazakhstan the UN is providing assistance to mothers and children in the zone of the ecological 
disaster of the Aral Sea and the Semipalatinsk test range. Thus, a tremendous achievement for
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The first experience for the both sides -  Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and
international organizations, on the other hand -  was meaningful and highly instructive.
International aid organizations, like various branches of the United Nations, having no
permanent presence in Central Asia prior to 1992, on the early stages of international
involvement operated under the perception that development is the same everywhere and
that techniques applied to Latin America or Africa would be suitable to the former Soviet
countries. Their personnel had little knowledge about both the region and the communist
system more broadly .Because  of this, there were tensions between these organizations
and Kazakhstani leaders who were told what to do by people with little realistic idea of
the problems they were facing. As John Schoeberlein has put it:
‘The United Nations and other agencies have gained valuable experience in the 
region. ... The Central Asian governments are also learning from experience, and 
while they have shortcomings, they share with their Soviet predecessors a sense 
of responsibility to provide for the basic needs of their population. ... [And] 
while the future of Central Asia’s economies and societies is bleak in many 
respects, hope lies in the synergy between outside aid, responsible 
administration, and the strong Central Asian traditions of community, mutual 
support, and entrepreneurship.”*^^
As for the United States, it welcomes Kazakhstan to strengthen its relations with 
Russia and other states of Central Asia, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to assert 
its membership in multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the
Kazakhstan’s delegation was a unanimous passing at the 52"  ^ UN General Assembly session in 1997 a 
special resolution to help in the rehabilitation of health o f the population and the environment in the area of 
the former nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk. The resolution was co-authored by 54 states including 
Russia and all CIS countries.
John Schoeberlein, “Between Two Worlds: Obstacles to Development and Prosperity”, Harvard 
International Review, vol. XXII, n o.l, (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 60.
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International Monetary Fund'^*, and the World Bank, demonstrating its commitment to 
values and accepted norms of behavior in the world.
2.2 Decreasing Security Risks and Evolving Security Arrangements
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not put an end to 
the nuclear danger in the world, on the contrary, the humanity had to be prepared for the 
new threats, though it was difficult to say whether these threats would arise from armed 
conflict within and among the former Soviet republics, four of which had nuclear 
weapons; from the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; from regional 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East; from terrorist attacks on 
American abroad and inside America; or from the growing intensity of ethnic rivalry and 
separatist violence, which could spill across borders.
2.2.1 The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Interests
Since new former Soviet republics gained their independence the international 
community has been ‘worried’ about their new defense strategies and postures. 
Kazakhstan was one of the four ex-Soviet states to inherent nuclear arsenal, and “spinners
For example. The International Monetary Fund has approved a loan about $86 million for Kazakhstan 
under the Fund’s systematic transformation facility (STF) to support the country’s economic and financial 
reform program. This loan differs from the IMF’s traditional standby loans by requiring compliance with 
somewhat fewer economic conditions and targets. See “Kazakhstan to get $86 million in STF funds”, 
Economic Highlights, USIA (US Information Agency) Wireless Files, Monday, (July 26,1993), p. 23.
“US-Kazakhstan Relations”, (25 May, 1992), p. 402.
Bill Clinton, “The US Should Aid the Former Soviet Republics”, in David Bender and Bruno Leone 
(eds.), American Foreign Policy: Opposing Viewpoints, (Opposing Viewpoints Series, Greenhaven Press, 
1993),p. 162.
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of scenarios wonder what would happen if Murphy’s Law ran amok and Kazakhstan 
became a radical Islamic state, took control of its portion of the old Soviet nuclear 
arsenal, and shared it with Iran.” ''^ ' Kazakhstan, however, was wise enough to contribute 
to disarmament by shutting down the nuclear polygon at Semipalatinsk, by disposing its 
nuclear weapons inheritance, by adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 
and by adopting a law on controlling the export of armaments, military hardware, and 
dual-use items.'“*^
And though the United States did not favor the Soviet Union’s breakup because of 
the possible instability and the increased risk of nuclear proliferation, theft, or 
accidents - it was interested in expanding its security cooperation with Kazakhstan. 
This partnership would enlarge the circle of US allies extending from the Pacific to the 
Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, and facilitate US policy of Iran’s encirclement and 
the potential containment of Russia if Russian-Western relations worsen.*“^  In other 
words, the United States doesn’t support any spread of nuclear weapons in Central Asia, 
considering its geostrategic location among nuclear powers and high potential for 
conflict. Moreover, under proliferation the US implies not only deployable weapons but 
also nuclear materials and technology, which even after deployment would be still 
present in Kazakhstan causing another concern about the sales and theft of nuclear 
components from the republic to terrorist states or criminal groups, because these 
elements of the nuclear fuel cycle are often minimally secured, and personnel may be
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 130.
Dastan Eleukhenov, “Perspectives on security in Kazakhstan”, in G. Bertsch, C. Craft, S. Jones, and M. 
Beck (eds.). Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
(2000), pp. 246-247.
Shirecn T. Hunter, “Central Asia since Independence”, The Washington Papers/168, pp. 157-158.
Ibid., p. 154.
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poorly paid, creating targets of opportunity.*'’^  And the last but not the least US concern 
is the massive spread of conventional weaponry to unstable regions of the world (ex. 
Middle East).*'’^  Thus, today the central ingredient to US grand and military strategy is 
arms eontrol considerations.
2.2.1.1 The Removal o f Nuclear Arsenal from  Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is the most crucial country in respect of nuclear arsenal, given that it 
possesses one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and, together with Uzbekistan, is 
among the world’s top producers of yellow cake (low enriched uranium). Besides nuclear 
weapons and uranium mines, there are nuclear research and power reactors, and milling 
facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.’“’^  Several plants in Kazakhstan deserve special 
attention: Kazakhstan’s Ulba fuel fabrication facility , which provides nuclear pellets to 
Russia and other NIS; a plant at Aktau, on the Caspian, - the world’s only nuclear 
desalinization facility '^^  ^ - processes uranium ore, and a breeder reactor, which produced 
an estimated 110 kilograms of plutonium per year*^ ;^ a plant in Petropavlovsk, which
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Seeurity: Issues and Implieations for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30, 1999), p. 12, also online http://www.fpc.gov/erscenas.htm.
Graham E. Fuller, “Central Asia and American National Interests”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Central Asia: 
Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (1994), pp. 129-143.
CRS Issue Brief 93108, Fostering Pro-western Orientation, (16 December, 1997), p. 11.
In the framework of the NPT, a joint project between Kazakhstan and the US was launched on the Ulba 
metallurgical factory (UMZ) in Ust-Kamenogorsk, which could recycle all types of uranium waste. 
American firm GNF (North Carolina) proposed its own nuclear scraps for this purpose. Nuclear Weapons 
Nonproliferation Organization has invested $1.2 million to renew technologies on UMZ. See Kislenkova, 
“Gde Nasha Ne Prodavala”, Express-K, (7 February 2002), p. 1.
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30, 1999), p. 12, also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm.
William C. Potter et al., “Nuclear Profiles o f the Soviet Successor States”, (Monterey, Calif.: Center for 
Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute o f International Studies, 1993), see also Robert Cullen, 
“Central Asia and the West” in Michael Mandelbaum (cd.). Central Asia and the World, (1993), p. 140.
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produced the nuclear-capable SS-21 short-range ballistic missile.'^' As for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), “the Soviet stationed 104 SS-18 ICBMs in 
Kazakhstan with a presumed total of 1.040 nuclear warheads, as well as 40 Bear-H long- 
range bombers carrying an estimated 370 nuclear warheads mounted on air-launched 
cruise missiles.” Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also hosted “major chemical and 
biological warfare (CBW) facilities'^^ during the Soviet era, raising major concerns in 
these states about possible environmental and proliferation dangers.”'^“* Later 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan reported that their mining and milling activities 
have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps.
Among other Central Asian republics Kazakhstan was the only one integrated into 
the strategic weapons program launched by the Soviet Union. On the territory of 
Kazakhstan was based one of the two Soviet underground nuclear testing sites, in 
Semipalatinsk. Kazakhstan’s intellectual circles and government opposed nuclear testing 
activities and demonstrated anti-nuclear moods. They accused the Soviet Union 
management of these sites in blatant disregard for the health of the people who live in the
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 141.
Ibid.
One o f the main US efforts in the region was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction from the region -  
to clean up old Soviet BW facilities on Vozrozhdeniye Island, especially taking into account the attempts of  
sophisticated terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. See B. Lynn Pascoe, 
“Security, Stability, Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line Affairs”, Remarks delivered at 
International Conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 
New Haven, Connecticut, September 20, 2002, see also online 
http://www.state.gOv/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639.htm.
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30, 1999), p. 12, also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm.
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r e g i o n . H e n c e ,  Kazakhstan made a decision to terminate nuclear testing in 
Semipalatinsk region and to convert the facility to other uses.'^^
However, though such a huge nuclear arsenal and its producing facilities gave 
Kazakhstan a formidable nuclear capability on paper, the actual control over missiles was 
in the hands of Russian Federation. Kazakhstan was only a producer of nuclear 
components, but never was capable to manufacture nuclear weapons. Hence, later four 
nuclear ex-Soviet states - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed an agreement 
putting their nuclear weapons under a single command. The only condition was that the 
weapons would be used only with the consent of all four states.
Notwithstanding, Western countries had a fear that the Muslim states of Pakistan 
and Iran, intent on advancing their nuclear ambitions, could prevail upon Kazakhstan, a 
fellow-Muslim state, to sell them nuclear arms and/or technology for hard currency'^*. 
Thus Washington increased its pressure on Kazakhstan to give up all its nuclear arms. In 
early 1990s Nazarbayev explained that it was difficult to do so because some politicians 
in Russia were claiming Kazakh territory, and textbooks in China continued to show parts 
of Kazakhstan as Chinese terri tory.Moreover, at that time CIS had uncertain future. 
During his visit to India in 1992, President Nazarbayev while promising to transfer 
Kazakhstan’s 650 tactical nuclear weapons to Russia insisted on keeping the strategic 
nuclear arms and destroying them only if the US, China, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus did
Graham Fuller, “Central Asia and the World”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the 
WorW, (1993), p. 112.
In October 1995, the US Defense Department agreed to assist Kazakhstan in sealing tunnels at 
Semipalatinsk, a former nuclear test site, to enhance security over nuclear waste.
Kohan, John, “What are they waiting for?” (6 April 1992), p. 15.
The reports in the Western media, based on information provided by an Iranian resistance organization 
in March (later proved to be baseless), that Alma Ata had sold three tactical nuclear weapons to Tehran 
added to Western apprehension.
Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, (1995), p. 122.
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the same.'^° He also clearly said that Kazakhstan had the right to join the ‘nuclear club’, 
and asked the USA to accept Kazakhstan as a ‘temporary nuclear weapon state’ and 
create a strategic alliance with it. However, in the end Kazakhstan finally chose to give 
up its nuclear weapons. Three circumstances played the vital role in Kazakhstan’s refusal 
to join the ‘nuclear club’: firstly, external powers exercised strong pressure by linking the 
nuclear weapon issue directly to the question of economic aid; secondly, both Ukraine 
and Belarus gave up their nuclear weapons to Russia; and finally, Kazakhstan received 
security guarantees from the USA, Russia and China, that they would not use or target 
their nuclear weapons against Kazakhstan if it removes the strategic nuclear weapons
from its territory. 161
2.2.1.2 US-Kazakhstan Bilateral Cooperation: Legal Framework and 
Financial Aid
Some crucial bilateral documents signed in early 90s, paved the way to the further 
and deeper US involvement into Kazakhstan’s development, especially in the military 
sphere. On 13 December 1993, Vice President A1 Gore and Kazakhstan President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the Safe, Secure, Dismantlement (SSD) agreement^^^. This 
legal act has guaranteed US assistance in the ultimate destruction of Kazakhstan’s nuclear
President Nazarbayev, answering correspondents’ questions during his visit to India on 22 February 
1992. Lotus Agency, New Deli, 22 February 1992, telegram (in English), cited by Guangcheng Xing, 
“China and Central Asia” in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: the New 
International Context, (2001), p. 155. See also Kohan, John, “What are they waiting for?” (6 April 1992), 
p. 15.
Guangcheng Xing, “China and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian 
Security: The New International Context, (2001), p. 155.
That was an agreement on obligating initial funds for the “safe and secure” dismantling of 
approximately 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes. See CRS Issue B r ie /93108, 
Fostering Pro-western Orientation, 12-16-1997.
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weapons arsenal. It also provided the legal framework for a series of measures for the 
safe, secure transportation, storage and destruction of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction. On 14 December 1993, Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan ratified the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which appealed to prevent further spread of 
nuclear weapons; fostered peaceful nuclear cooperation under safeguards; encouraged 
negotiations to end the nuclear arms race with a view to general and complete 
disarmament.’^ ^
Another important legal document was Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
-  to which Kazakhstan became a party after signing a Lisbon protocol on 23 May 
1 9 9 2  165 Treaty became an important guarantor of maintaining global stability and 
the first agreement that fixed the principles of reducing existing levels of strategic nuclear 
weapons. In accordance with this Treaty Kazakhstan was obliged to carry out the 
elimination of all types of nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, within the 
7-year period of time; and to establish effective national control over nonproliferation of 
the weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies to third countries'^’. For 
this purpose US Congress has set up appropriate funds, sponsored by Sam Nunn and 
Richard Lugar in order to promote disarmament purposes, and has authorized up to $84 
million to carry out the implementing measures, out of which $70 million helped 
Kazakhstan to meet its destruction obligations under the START I treaty -  for example.
1
Shevis, Jim, “US, Kazakhstan sign nuclear dismantlement pact”, USIA (US Information Agency) 
Wireless Files, (December 14,1993), p. 7-8.
This document will affect over 1000 warheads from SS-18 missiles, the most deadly in the Cold War 
arsenal o f the former Soviet Union. See “US will help Kazakhstan get Russian guarantees on pipeline”, (16 
February 1994), p. 3. See also Mendigaliyev, “O Hode Rcalizazii Soglashenii mezhdu RK i Amcrikoi po 
Predotvrashcniyu Rasprostraneniya Yademogo Oruzhiya”, Bağdar Orientir, N 1, (2002), pp. 46-53.
K. K. Tokayev, Diplomatiya Respubliki Kazakhstan, (2001). Kazakhstan ratified that accord in July 
1992.
Allen Lynch, The Cold War is Over - Again, (Westview Press, 1992), p. 166.
“US-Kazakhstan Relations”, (25 May, 1992), p. 402.
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destroying underground missile silos.'^* The first $14.5 million were spent on emergency 
response equipment, communication links, a system for monitoring civilian nuclear 
material and an export control system.
In January 1994 the Trilateral statement was signed by the Presidents of the 
United States, Russia, and Ukraine at the US-Russian Summit where parties 
acknowledged that Kazakhstan should be compensated for the value of the highly 
enriched uranium contained in nuclear warheads located on its territory or already 
transferred to Russia, and other costs of nuclear disarmament.'^” On 30 September 1996, 
$110.54 million in Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) funds for 
denuclearization and demilitarization had been obligated to Kazakhstan. Understanding 
the high cost of nuclear dismantlement initiative President Clinton announced an increase 
in aid to Kazakhstan, from $91 million to $311 million for economic and military 
reforms.'^'
Furthermore, the United States concern was not only the removal of nuclear 
weaponry but also the future of nuclear plants, uranium mines, milling facilities, and 
nuclear test sites. Thus, the US eagerly assisted Central Asian states in dealing with the 
immovable nuclear facilities:
“As of September 30,1998, $175.75 million in CTR program and Department of 
Energy funds for denuclearization, demilitarization, enhancing the “chain of 
custody”, and materials protection, control, and accounting had been obligated to
Sullivan Alexander, “Clinton sees long-term partnership with Kazakhstan”, USIA (US Information 
Agency) Wireless Files, February 15, 1993, p. 6-7.
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 141.
CRS Issue Brief 93108, Fostering Pro-western Orientation, 12-16-1997, p. 11. In November 1994, in the 
framework o f the “Project Sapphire” operation on removal of uranium, the United States repackaged and 
removed about 600 kilograms of highly enriched, nonirradiated uranium from an inadequately safeguarded 
warehouse in Kazakhstan, shipping it to the United States. The operation was conducted with the approval 
of Russian and Kazakhstani authorities, under compensation arrangements covered by the Trilateral 
Agreement.
Sullivan Alexander, “Clinton sees long-term partnership with Kazakhstan”, (February 15, 1993), p. 6-7.
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (most went to Kazakhstan). Such 
material physical protection aid provided to Kazakhstan’s Ulba Metallurgical 
Plant included alarms, computers for inventory control, and hardening of doors. 
Similar aid has been provided for Kazakhstan’s Aktau reactor, and agreements 
were signed at the November 1997 meeting of the US Kazakh Joint Commission 
to study how to safely and securely store over 300 metric tons of highly -  
enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel from the reactor. An accord on US 
aid for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Kazakhstan was also signed.
2.2.2 Containment o f Terrorism and Drug-Trafficking
It has become cliché that after September 11, 2001, the countries of Central Asia
ceased being a backwater of US strategic interests and instead became front-line states in
the global war against terrorism. Five Central Asian states immediately reacted on
President Bush’s appeal to join the US in the war on terrorism^^" .^ They proclaimed
solidarity with Washington and proposed the United States to use, variously, their land
and air space in the anti-Taliban campaign. President Nazarbayev confidently stated:
We shouldn’t close out eyes before the global terrorist danger, especially when it 
takes its most aggressive forms; vice versa we should combine our efforts and 
struggle with it collectively, without geopolitical egoism, inter-confessional 
prejudice and political ambitions.
During his visit to Kazakhstan, the US Minister of Defense said on the conference 
that two countries are good partners in the global war on terrorism and they have 
common interest in independent, economically healthy and secure Afghanistan. 
Kazakhstan could be an excellent example of democratic society for Afghanistan and also
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30,1999), p. 15, also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm.
B. Lynn Pascoe, “Security, Stability, Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line Affairs”, (September 
20, 2002), see also online http://www.state.gOv/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639.htm.
Kazakhstan was the first to support anti terrorist coalition, which was created by the US. See Baigozhina, 
“Partnerstvo vo Imya Mira”, Express-K, (8 December 2001), p. 1.
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Boris Rumer, “The Powers in Central Asia”, (Autumn 2002), p. 57. 
N.A. Nazarbayev, Kriticheskoe desyatiletie, (2003), p. 17.
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could be a source of humanitarian help: it has already supplied 3.000 tones of grain and 
signed contracts with the UN World Food Programme to supply additional 100.000 tones 
of grain
However, Moscow and Beijing couldn’t ignore Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
statement, during his December 2001 visit to Tashkent, that US interests in Central Asia 
far exceed the Afghanistan conflict. Two states interpreted this statement as a proof of 
US long-term strategic stand in Eurasia, including control of energy resources.’’* Central 
Asia is an important region for Russia; hence, in case the US remains there longer than is 
needed to complete its anti-terrorist operation, serious tension between Russia and the
United States could be created. 179
The war in Afghanistan brought to the surface other acute threats to Central Asian 
stability, including uninterrupted flows of insurgents, drugs, weapons, and refugees 
across the region’s porous borders'*®, which made the region incapable of protecting by 
themselves the boundaries that the Bolsheviks drew. Another negative eonsequence of 
the penetrability of the borders was the emergence of Central Asian states as one of the 
main highways for opium , which finds its way via Russia to European drug markets.
In this respect, Kazakhstan has dangerous geographical location playing the role of a 
transit point between Afghanistan and the main drug-consumer markets in Eastern and
Edolfus Tauns, “Kazahstan -  samii nadezhnii soyuznik Socdinennih Shtatov v Tzentralnoi Azii”, 
Express-K, (23 May 2002), p.3.
Ibid., p. 58.
A. Orlov, “On the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, vol. 48, n.2, (2002), p. 
4.
Pauline Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, 
n. 2, (March/April 2002), p. 65.
Afghanistan occupies the leading position among opium and heroin producers. Afghanistan plantations 
make up 75-80 percent of the world’s heroin production. Yearly Afghanistan produces 2.8-4.8 thousand 
tones of opium. See N.A. Nazarbayev, Kriticheskoe desyatiletie, (2003), pp. 118-119.
Pauline Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia”, (March/April 2002), p. 
66. See also Lubin, Nancy “Central Asia: Issues and Challenges for United States Policy”, in A. Banuazizi 
and M. Weiner (eds.). The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), p. 264.
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Western Europe.'^^ Today drug business became global business with speedy 
industrialization and improving new technologies, which gives a real security threat for 
each state.'*"' Thus only international cooperation could decrease or even stop the 
ominous terrorist threat'*^ and global drug trafficking. And for the United States the main 
task should be the targeting of these high-risk areas, which could provide an important 
victory for the US policy before the regional anarchy would lead to another anti-Western 
terrorist formation.
In April 2000 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her visit to Almaty
and Bishkek offered security assistance in combating terrorism . NATO officials have
raised the idea of NATO assistance for anti-terrorist efforts in Central Asia.*^  ^ In July
2000, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson during his visit to Kazakhstan stated:
‘terrorism, the trafficking of narcotics and extremism are threats which have 
direct and far reaching consequences also for Europe’ and ‘a crisis in the Central 
Asian region could put under threat the security and stability in the whole Euro-
Atlantic region.’188
The FBI, DEA, and Customs have given “training in counter narcotics to police, 
customs, and border control personnel in Central Asia as part of the Anti-Crime Training 
and Technical Assistance Program sponsored by the State Department’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.” The nature of the terrorist
N.A. Nazarbayev, Kriticheskoe desyatiletie, (2003), p.l 19.
*^^Ibid.,p. 120.
Ibid., p. 37. In 2002, during the first eight months, because o f the terrorist actions died 4776 people 
(more than in 2001), which showed the increasing level o f terrorist danger.
In April 2000, US government granted $70 million for anti-terrorist assistance to train frontier-guards 
and customs officials, and to buy communication technologies. See Elizabeth Jones, “O Politike 
Soedinennih Shtatov v Tzentralnoi Asii”, (21 December 2001), p .l.
Roy Allison, “Conclusion: Central Asian Security in the Regional and International Context”, in Roy 
Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: The New International Context, (2001), p. 261.
Ibid.
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30, 1999), p. 15, also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm. Thus, in FY 1998, about
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threat demonstrated the inevitability of strengthening the international community, which 
is mostly based on nonproliferation agreements, intelligence cooperation, and 
legitimizing institutions such as the United Nations, as well as a broad consent on 
democracy, human rights, and free markets.
2.2.3 Is the Membership in International and Regional Military 
Arrangements efficient?
Today there are many unstable spots, such as Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Nagorno- 
Karabakh, Chechnya, and others, which worry Central Asian countries. The unsettled 
conflicts in these regions cause a danger of spillover to Central Asian states, so they 
decided to act jointly in combating these threats. Thus, in the early 1990s, regional 
cooperation took its start.
On 15 May 1992, Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security of the CIS states was 
signed. It became the legal basis for the most prominent multilateral military security 
structure based on the CIS organization involving the Central Asian states. The treaty 
mainly was concerned with external threats, but the signatories also committed 
themselves to refrain from the use of force against one another. In other words, the Treaty 
fixed the right to collective defence, mechanism of joint consultation to coordinate their 
positions and take measures if there is a threat to the security. To Russia this treaty was 
an important one, because it maintained close military and security relations among new 
states on the former Soviet territory, and guaranteed Russia a leading position. However
180 Kazakh, 138 Kyrgyz, 22 Tajik, 64 Turkmen, and 91 Uzbek law enforcement officials participated in 
these courses, which included basic and advanced counter-narcotics efforts.
Michael Hirst, “Bush and the World”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, n.5, (September/October 2002), p. 22.
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this treaty didn’t achieve military integration: no joint CIS forces were ever created, no 
common military policy was agreed upon, and no legal basis for the use of force in the 
event of an emergency was elaborated, though Councils for coordinating policy on 
military and security affairs were created.'^' Thus, this Treaty had only tactical
. 192importance.
Other regional initiatives followed later: the Central Asian Economic Community 
(CAEC), established in 1994, had essentially consultative framework and addressed 
security issues to only a limited extent; Eurasian Union was proposed by President 
Nazarbayev in March 1994 ; the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Measures in Asia (CICA) was also Nazarbayev’s proposal as an Asian version of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); a nuclear-free zone, which 
began as a joint Uzbek and Kyrgyz proposal, was supported by all the CIS Central Asian
194states later.
However, apart from regional cooperation, Kazakhstan is very determined to 
improve the composition and quality of its own forces. It intends to create a full-fledged 
military, with army, air force, and even navy (for service in the Caspian) branches under
Arkady Dubnov, “Best wishes for CIS Security”, Vremya MN, 22 January 1999, p. 6 in Former Soviet 
Union 15 Nations: Policy and Security, January 1999, p. 31, also cited by Lena Jonson, “Russia and Central 
Asia” in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: the New International Context, 
(2001), p. 104.
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995).
The project includes a section on defence which envisages joint measures to strengthen the armed forces 
of Union states and the creation of a ‘common defence space’ to coordinate defence activities. The Union 
would include Russia, but a strong emphasis on the parity of the members would make it difficult for 
Russia to dominate its proceedings. Russian support for the project has anyway been lukewarm, since it has 
interpreted the Union as an attempt to shift the initiative and terms for integration from Moscow to Almaty. 
Uzbekistan in turn has viewed the Union as an instrument to raise the standing of Kazakhstan in Central 
Asia and has rejected it decisively. See Roy Allison, “Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy and 
Cooperation in Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: The New 
International Context, (2001), p. 223.
Lena Jonson, Roy Allison, “Central Asian Security: Internal and External Dynamics”, in Roy Allison 
and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: The New International Context, (2001), p .21.
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the direction of Minister of Defense.Especially the border incidents with Uzbekistan, 
in 1999, made Kazakhstan to start immediate modernization and improvement of the 
combat ability of its armed forces. Kazakh Defence Minister, Mukhtar Altinbayev, stated 
in May 1997:
“that Kazakhstan plans in the future transfer its army to work on a professional 
basis. Following the border incident, Kazakhstan intended to increase its defense 
expenditures and provide extra tax privileges for arm producers. The Kazakh 
Defence Ministry ordered a number of the newest Russian military technologies, 
including several SU-27 and MIG-31 fighters and the S-300 air-defence missile 
system, which started being delivered in 1999. Because of military reforms and 
new weapon deliveries, Kazakhstan, with its army of only 68.000 personnel 
became the most combat capable country in Central Asia.”’’*^
Starting from the mid-1990s the Central Asian states focused on the formation of 
new military relations outside the context of the CIS in order to lessen their dependence 
on Russia. Today Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan (with some legal 
limitations) have the largest ongoing programs with the US, expanding security 
cooperation throughout the region of the Caspian B a s i n . A l s o  NATO did not stay 
aside. NATO was anxious about the possibility of civic chaos and interethnic conflicts in 
the CIS, which could jeopardize Eurasian s t a b i l i t y 'O n  20 December 1991 the North 
Atlantic Council Cooperation (NACC)'^^ was founded, which became an official basis 
for NATO’s cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe and in the CIS.
 ^ Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asians New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, 
(1996), p. 73.
Zharmukhamed Jardikhan, “Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional Perspectives”, Central Asian 
Survey, vol.21, n.2, (June 2002), p. 173.
Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: in Search of Stability, 
(2000), pp. 27-28.
Kanat Saudabayev, “Kazakhstan and NATO -  Towards an Eurasian Security System”, NATO's Sixteen 
Nations, no. 2, (1994), pp. 33-34.
The NACC membership includes all the CIS countries, the ex-members of the Warsaw Pact, Albania, 
and Croatia, and its principal function is to oversee the further development of dialogue, cooperation and 
consultation between NATO and its cooperation partners in Central and Eastern Europe and on the territory 
of the former Soviet Union. This membership in the NACC allows for a close interaction between the full 
members of NATO and the partners. See Shircen T. Hunter, “Central Asia since Independence”, p. 152.
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Furthermore, in 1994, NATO designed a special program- the Partnership fo r  Peace 
(PIP)- for ex-Soviet countries. PfP program envisaged close cooperation with European 
security mechanisms to establish Eurasian security system and to focus mostly on how to 
prevent the conflict from spreading and urge the belligerents to sit down at the 
negotiating table.^ ®'* Clinton expressed his view on the part of the PfP in the following 
terms:
The whole idea of Partnership for Peace is to give countries that are not in NATO 
-  that were part of the Warsaw Pact or part of the former Soviet Union or were 
just simply neutral and not in NATO -  the opportunity to participate in military 
planning and exercises and to increase a level of confidence and security on the 
part of those countries.^“'
Kazakhstan, on its crucial stage of the build-up of its armed forces, is interested 
not only in studying the experience of NATO and its member states, but also in 
expanding its cooperation with them. Participation in the PfP allows for closer 
collaboration in defense planning and military issues . However, the negative side of 
the connections with NATO is the possible confrontation with Russia. Worsening 
Russian-Western relations could put before the regional states a dilemma to choose 
between NATO and Russia. On the other hand, ties with NATO could help these 
countries better to resist the Russian pressure in a variety of areas, and avoid Russian
NATO has all the prerequisites for doing this, as it possesses a mighty military, material, technical, 
manpower and financial potential; besides, it has everything it needs to create conflict-related data banks 
and monitoring services which are indispensable to conflict prevention. See Kanat Saudabayev, 
“Kazakhstan and NATO -  Towards an Eurasian Security System”, (1994), pp. 33-34.
“US will help Kazakhstan get Russian guarantees on pipeline”, (16 February 1994), p. 4.
Troops from the 500-member regional peacekeeping battalion (formed in 1996 under UN auspices by 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) took part in PfP style exercises in September 1997 in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan along with 500 US troops who flew directly from the United States. Other soldiers or 
observers from Russia, Turkey, Denmark, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and the Baltic states also took 
part. Many in Central Asia and elsewhere viewed these exercises as sending a message to Islamic 
fundamentalists and others in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against fostering instability in the region. 
See CRS Issue Brief 93108, Fostering Pro-western Orientation, 12-16-1997, p. 7.
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dominance in military issues. Russia from its side has strongly disapproved PfP 
activities in Eurasia perceiving it as a part of a Western strategy of advancing 
‘geopolitical pluralism’ and Western interests in the ‘post-Soviet space’.
But in spite of Russia’s objections, international military cooperation in Central 
Asia is increasing. This engagement strategy is also part of the USA’s global strategy to 
provide stable, competent, peacetime military professionalism and to enhance capability 
for participating in the initial stages of any future conflict and successfully making the 
transition to war.^ *^  ^US engagement programs take the form of joint exercises, staff visits, 
training, increasing interoperability to help shape the peacetime environment. President 
Nazarbayev sees Kazakhstan’s future security based on its good relationships with 
Europe and North America, as well as with Russia and China.^^^
2.3 Economic Interests
2.3.1 Increasing Business Activities with the Western Partners in Kazakhstan
Central Asia is blessed with natural resources - a promising factor for economic 
prosperity. Especially after the discovery of the rich oil fields in the Caspian Sea,
90^
 ^ Ibid., p. 153. However, PiP membership cannot provide a security guarantee (unlike NATO 
membership) and therefore cannot be expected to address significant external challenges to the security of 
Central Asian states. See also Roy Allison, “Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy and 
Cooperation in Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: The New 
International Context, (2001), p. 231.
204 Ibid., p. 233.
' Stephen Blank, “The United States and Central Asia, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central 
Asian Security: The New International Context, (2001), p. 129.
Roger Barnett, “Extraordinary Power Projection: An Operational Concept for the US Navy”, Strategic 
Research Development Report 5-96, US Naval War College, 1996, pp. 7-8, cited by Stephen Blank, “The 
United States and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: the New 
International Context, (2001), p. 139.
Sullivan Alexander, “Clinton sees long-term partnership with Kazakhstan”, (February 15, 1993), p. 6-7.
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economic interest toward this region noticeably increased. Today there are many big and 
small foreign firms, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations, 
working in Central Asian states^^ .^ They admit the high potential of these countries 
possessing natural and mineral resources and well-educated young population with new 
thinking and big desire to benefit their countries.
As for the United States, the main economic interest in the region is focused 
mainly on oil and gas^^ .^ The opening of the Caspian states to foreign investment 
represented a great opportunity to the United States as the world’s largest oil consumer 
and im porter.^Energy involves US companies into the region development and energy 
related projects^^^ Thus the cornerstone of the US-Kazakhstani cooperation in the energy 
sector was one of the earliest (and largest) deals - a $20 billion joint venture between 
Chevron and Kazakhstan, concluded in April 1993.^^  ^ Later followed other major oil 
contracts, which were signed between American oil companies and the government of 
Kazakhstan, so that the region received special attention of the American public, and the 
commercial interests of US oil companies in exploiting new energy reserves gave US
But there is no full database on foreign partners in Kazakhstan, hence, while signing contracts 
Kazakhstani side is guided mostly by intuition rather than by welkcalculated comparative analysis. See R. 
M. Kalieva, “Diplomatiya Kazahstana na poroge novoi eri”, Kazahstanskaya Pravda, (15 May 1996), p. 4.
However, it is difficult to talk about partnership equality in the US-Kazakhstani relations, because both 
countries have different levels of economic and political development. The US is mainly focused on rich 
natural resources and the potential market for American products. And given that the US is the main 
investor in Kazakhstan, the latter is highly financially dependent on the former, putting equality apart in 
their relations. See Leila Ivatova, “Amerikano-Kazahstanskie Otnosheniya: Opit Politologicheskogo 
Analiza Rezultatov Expertnogo Oprosa”, Sayasat, N 10, (1999), pp. 43-48.
Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
315.
During his December visit to the US, President Nazarbayev met with directors o f some American firms 
functioning in Kazakhstan, like “Phillips Petroleum”. They expressed deep satisfaction with their business 
in Kazakhstan and they are eager to invest additional capital also into technologies and specialists. See 
Vadim Mahin, “Reka Investizii Ne Obmeleet”, Kazahstanskaya Pravda, (21 December 2001).
Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
311.
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policymakers a reason to protect its interests in the Caucasus and Central A s i a A  huge 
investment flow into potentially oil-rich states of Central Asia turns this region into the 
US strategic zone. Also, Central Asia is likely to emerge as an alternative source of oil 
supply, decreasing the US dependence on the Middle East oil '^'*. Caspian could diversify 
world energy supply away from the Middle East, though competition between the two 
oil-producers would certainly make oil cheaper on the international market.
Nevertheless, not only American firms operate in the region strengthening 
bilateral cooperation, but also many European and Asian business circles show their 
desire to increase their involvement. For example, in January 1995, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and the Sultanate of Oman signed a protocol on the beginning of construction of the 
Caspian pipeline system. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) was formed to realize 
this project, which would cost up to $1.2 billion.^'^ And in March 1995, government of 
Kazakhstan, the Kazakh gaz state holding company, the Russian Gazprom joint-stock 
company and the British-Italian ‘British Gas-Agip’ alliance signed an interim agreement 
for the development of one of the world’s biggest oil and gas condensate fields at 
Karachaganak in the southwest of Kazakhstan. Moreover, China is keen on closer 
cooperation with Kazakhstan, which is beneficial for both countries. In September 1997, 
China signed an agreement for its largest potential investment in economic cooperation 
with Central Asia -  to construct a 3000-km long oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to
Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 
1991”, (February 2001), also online
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/lhill/2001politiquc.htm.
Hafeez Malik (ed.). Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (1994), p. 11. 
Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (1995), p. 27.
"^Ibid.
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western China. Increasing Chinese economic activity in Central Asia, especially in 
Kazakhstan made it the second largest trading partner of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.^'*
Development of the energy sector caused the appearance of other support 
businesses, such as communications, construction, services to new airline routes and 
others. Thus, for example, large American consumer-oriented companies (Procter and 
Gamble, Coca-Cola), manufacturers of agricultural and heavy equipment (John Deere) 
are already helping to develop other spheres of Kazakhstani economy apart from energy 
sector.^^'' This factor is extremely important for the young country, which understands the 
necessity of development of each sector of economy in order to avoid any hybrid 
economic structures.
However, increasing foreign economic activity in Central Asia makes Russia very 
much concerned about losing its sphere of influence. But in spite of Russia’s 
dissatisfaction, international foreign companies intend to maintain their financial 
assistance and business activities in the region, which comes as a response to several 
factors: - the present and projected decline of production in great oil provinces such as 
the Alaskan North Slope and the North Sea; - the Caspian Sea largest underdeveloped oil 
and gas reserves; - the strong opposition to foreign investment in energy sector in several 
major oil producers (i.e., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) in the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East, while others (i.e., Iran, Iraq, and Libya) have been under either US unilateral or UN 
multilateral economic sanctions; - economies in Baku, Astana, and Ashgabat strongly
217
Guangchcng Xing, “China and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian 
Security: The New International Context, (2001), p. 156.
Ibid. Trade between China and the Central Asian states is diversified: there is intergovernmental, local, 
barter, remittance and frontier trade.
Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: in Search of Stability, 
(2000), pp. 29-31.
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need foreign investments as an essential prerequisite for their economic growth to stop
deterioration of standards of living and to fully utilize their hydrocarbon resources.221
2.3.2 The Caspian Sea Oil
While talking about Caspian Sea^^ ,^ it seems logical to start from giving a brief 
historical background. It was the mid-19“’ century when commercial activity started in 
the Caspian basin, making it one of the world’s first energy provinces. In 1900 the Baku 
region produced approximately half of the world’s total crude oil, owing to combined 
efforts and investment by the Nobel brothers, the Rothschilds, and the leaders of Royal 
Dutch Shell, who helped Russia explore Caspian oil resources.^^^ Caspian remained 
unexplored to the fullest extent, while being a part of the USSR, because Soviet Union 
lacked technology to develop its offshore oil and gas reserves and it also wished to keep 
them as a ‘strategic reserve’ .
In the early 1990s, the grandiose exploration of Caspian energy resources started 
and, first of all, it was necessary to get the precise volume of the reserves. Many seismic 
tests were carried out in the Kazakhstani part of the Caspian Sea and results presented by 
the Caspian Sea Consortium, in June 1999, showed “official estimates of 73 billion
Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics o f the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
311.
Caspian Sea -  the length is 700-miles and it is located in the northwest Asia surrounding by five 
countries -  Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.
Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
310.
Mustafa Aydin, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and 
Predicament, (Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, 2000), p. 46.
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barrels of crude oil and 2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas” This meant that 
Kazakhstan’s sector held reserves “ten times bigger than those of its onshore Tengiz 
oilfield and [much larger than] Russia’s entire oil reserves of 6.7 billion tons [48.9 billion 
barrels].” Tengiz Basin of western Kazakhstan is considered to be the most important 
Central Asian field, which is already the subject of a reported $20 billion deal between 
the government of Kazakhstan and Chevron Corporation.^^^ Identified reserves of Tengiz 
Basin are “estimated at sixteen billion barrels, about one-sixth the proven reserves of 
Kuwait”^^ ,^ and considered as one of the world’s ten largest, which may contain up to 50 
percent more recoverable reserves than previously thought. Kazakhstan has large oil 
reserves in the field of Kashagan now being explored in the Caspian, which may be as 
much as three times larger than Tengiz.^^^ In the early 2000s, there were exciting 
discoveries after some seismic studies and preliminary drilling in the offshore Kashagan 
block by the Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company (OKIOC), 
presenting spectacular results with analysts estimating possible oil reserves of up to 40 
billion barrels, of which 10 billion barrels are thought to be recoverable. Accordingly, the
OMRI Daily D igest, no. 125, part 1 (June 27, 1996), cited by Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The 
Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains”, in ed. by Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, Energy and Conflict in 
Central Asia and Caucasus, (2000), p.82.
^^ I^bid.
Nick Moore, “Chevron Sets Big Deal to Develop Oil Field in Kazakhstan”, Washington Post, April 7, 
1993, C l, also see Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West” in Michael Mandclbaum (ed.). Central Asia 
and the World, (1993), p. 139. Estimates of this field’s undiscovered reserves range from ten billion tone to 
hundred billion barrels, with the safest guess being around thirty billion barrels. An additional twelve 
billion barrels of identified reserves lie under the Caspian Sea, in fields shared by Russia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Only one other field, the North Ustiert, shared by Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, has identified reserves of more than a billion barrels.
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the 
World, (1993), p. 139.
Nancy Lubin, “Pipe Dreams: Potential Impacts o f Energy Exploitation”, Harvard International Review, 
vol. XXII, no.l, (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 66. See also Rashid Dusembayev, “Astana Ishet Sblizheniya s 
Vashingtonom”, Vremya Po, (18 February 2002), p. 10. On the World Economic Forum in New York Mr. 
Tokayev, Minister of Foreign Affairs o f Kazakhstan, assured that gigantic American companies should 
have their own share in exploitation of the offshore blocks around Kashagan oil field, where oil deposits 
make up 10 billion barrels.
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field is considered as one of the largest oil discoveries in the world in the last several
decades.230
However there are many contradictions between the assessments provided by the 
United States government on one side and academic institutions and industry experts on 
the other. In accordance with some analysts, this incompatibility in the assessment of the 
Caspian region’s oil and gas resources reflects “an orchestrated effort by Washington to 
exaggerate the significance of the region’s hydrocarbon wealth to reduce American and 
Western energy dependence on the Persian Gulf.”^^ * Today the world’s energy 
consumption is growing, which paves the way for increase and diversification of world 
energy supplies. In accordance with the Energy Information Administration’s forecast we 
should expect:
“world o il  co n su m p tio n  to grow by an average annual rate of nearly two percent, 
reaching 87 million barrels in 2005 and 104 million barrels a day in the year 
2015. By the year 2015, the world’s energy consumption is expected to be 55 
percent higher than it was in 1995.’’^ ^^
The United States Administration, considering how to secure American energy 
supplies into the 21'*' century, released Comprehensive National Energy Strategy (CNES), 
which established far-reaching goals and objectives: to ameliorate the efficiency of the 
overall energy system; to assure against energy supply disruption; to support energy 
production and use it with respect to health and environmental values; to expand future 
choices; to strengthen international cooperation on global energy issues . One of the
Gawdat Bahgal, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
313. This suggests that Kashagan has the potential to produce up to 2 million barrels of light crude a day 
once the field is fully developed.
Ibid., p.312.
'^ I^bid.
Ibid. See also L. M. Ivatova, SShA vo Vneshnei Politike Respubliki Kazakstan, (1999), p. 76. And 
National Security Strategy, p. 5-6.
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Chapters of this 70-page Strategy was devoted to Caspian region, where American 
interests were clearly stated: to support Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; to create good 
commercial conditions for the oil companies working in the region; to stimulate Greece 
and Turkey to combine their gas pipeline network, which would allow European 
consumers to diversify the source of gas import; to deepen commercial dialog in order to 
create strong, transparent and stable business climate for the projects in the sphere of 
energy and adjacent infrastructure; to further oppose any investments to Iran^ ·^*.
Analyzing global energy supplies options, US attention focused on the Caspian 
Sea energy potential. First and foremost, the United States defined several interests and 
objectives in the Caspian region: to support the process of nation-building in Central Asia 
and strengthen its economic and political independence from Moscow; to explore and 
develop the Caspian’s hydrocarbon resources, hence, increasing the global oil and gas 
supplies and diversifying suppliers; to oppose Russian monopoly over oil and gas 
pipelines from the Caspian Sea; to expand the United States’ sanctions policy against Iran 
to the Caspian; to support Turkey in playing a key role in the Caspian energy 
infrastructure ; to promote regional conflict resolution; to continue support for US 
companies^^^. These goals should help the United States to formulate coherent policy 
toward the Caspian region.
Valerii Markov, “Kazahslan v Zone Strategicheskih Interesov Soedinennih Shtatov”, Vremya Po, (25 
March 2002), p. 14.
Gawdat Bahgal, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
315.
Ambassador Eizenstat, “US Economic and Strategic interests in the Caspian Sea region: Policies and 
Implications”, 105‘^  Congress, US Senate Subcommittee on international economic policy, export and trade 
promotion of the Committee on foreign relations, Washington, (October 23, 1997), p. 13.
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2.3.2.1 The Exploration o f Caspian Sea Energy Resources: Predictions vs. 
Reality
Early explorations and optimistic predictions gave grandiose visions of oil wealth 
and raised popular expectations that oil and gas reserves can serve as the panacea for all 
that ails Kazakhstan.^^’ However some problems complicating exploration evolved: 
firstly, the oil had high sulfur content and therefore required a more expensive and 
complex refining process than the sweet crude oil of Saudi Arabia^^*; secondly, it was 
difficult to transport oil from Central Asia, thus a long transnational pipeline was needed 
to get oil to the sea-port. In accordance with some western estimates, the real income 
generated from Kazakhstan’s energy wealth would be smaller than expected by 
government leaders due to the high oil transportation costs from a land-locked state to 
world markets; and the widespread decrease in world oil prices since the 1980s. 
Moreover, some unfavorable factors could affect the development of Caspian Basin and 
cause the decrease of investment flow, for example: if oil prices decrease; if world oil 
supply is boosted by increases in oil extraction in the newly developed fields of China, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia; if international politics change, and sanctions 
against Iraq would be lifted or US position toward Iran would soften.^“**^ Furthermore, 
exploration of the Caspian oil fields brought competition among international and 
regional powers, hampering the further progress in exploration and pipelines
Ibid., pp. 83-84.237
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 139.
Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains”, in Robert Ebel and 
Rajan Menon (eds.). Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and Caucasus, (2000), p. 85.
Mustafa Aydin, New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and 
Predicament, (2000), p. 48.
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construction. For example, the Russian political elite acted as “if they prefer that the 
area’s resources not be developed at all if Russia cannot have complete control over 
access.’’^ '^ Nevertheless, under Putin Russia’s Caspian policy is increasingly driven by 
pragmatic considerations rather than strategic ones and it moves away from trying to 
contain US expansion in the region in favor of ‘constructive engagement’ with American 
government and oil companies . Two examples illustrate this trend: enhancing energy 
cooperation between two traditional rivals, Russia and Turkey, and the rising partnership 
in several oil schemes between Moscow and Washington.
Other two geopolitical powers seek to enhance their participation in exploration 
and transportation of Caspian oil -  Iran and Turkey. Iran is interested in distribution and 
the transportation of Caspian oil in order to benefit from it not only materially but also to 
use it as a way of loosening the US embargo. Apart from Turkey’s strategic location, 
which makes it a natural ‘energy-bridge’ between major oil and gas suppliers from the 
Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea to consumer markets in Europe,^'^ Turkey’s energy 
consumption is growing much faster than its production, making it a rapidly growing 
energy importer. Turkish experts consider that Turkey could consume 15 million tones of 
oil carried along a Baku-Ceyhan pipeline yearly
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
(1997), p. 140. That proprietary attitude is rooted in history, and it will take time and outside pressures 
before it changes.
James A. Baker, “Running on Empty? Prospects for Future Oil Supplies”, (III Institute for public Policy, 
Houston, Texas: Rice University Press, 2000), p.lO, cited by Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The 
Geopolitics o f the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 316.
Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics o f the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
316. Russia’s pragmatic policy seems to be paying off. Since the late 1990s Moscow has succeeded in 
negotiating and constructing a number o f pipeline schemes between its ports and oil and gas fields in the 
Caspian. Furthermore, Russian oil and gas companies are heavily involved in most multilateral energy 
consortia in the region.
Ibid., p .317.
Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian 
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2.3.2.2 Oil Pipeline Routes: Economic Feasibility vs. “Great Game”
The exploration of Caspian oil reserves implied the necessity of pipeline 
construction; the extracted ‘black gold’ needed to be transported to the world markets. 
During Soviet period Moscow maintained control in the region monopolizing the pipeline 
system for oil and gas exports. Having no port of its own, Kazakhstan needed Russia’s 
cooperation and access to its pipelines and port facilities. This dependence on Russia 
posed difficulties when it came to transport quotas, fees, price levels and forms of 
payment, which made export across Russian territory a less attractive option to 
Kazakhstan.^“*^ Bypassing Russia meant shipping oil south, through Iran, which would 
jeopardize the international financing Kazakhstan needed for its development projects. 
After careful considerations, it was obvious that Novorossiisk network didn’t correspond 
to the new economic and political dynamics anymore. Several factors supported this 
assumption: there was doubt that the Russian network can meet the projected increasing 
level of exports; oil tankers from Novorossiisk had to transit the crowded Bosphorus 
Strait to gain access to the European market which created environmental and safety 
hazards; Russian oil network was aimed at the Mediterranean market, avoiding the vast 
Asian states; political and security concerns as to whether Russia would stay as a sole 
export outlet for the Caspian states. "^*’
Thus the young country faced the challenge to try other options for oil and gas 
transportation. Several pipeline routes were under government’s consideration. Not only
Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign policy, and Regional Security, 
(1996), pp. 57-58.
Ibid., p. 323.
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economic feasibility was taken into account but also political strategic interests, and 
interests of foreign and regional powers. In this respect, the United States favors 
development of pipelines that “would connect the coming Caspian and Central Asian oil 
boom directly to world markets without Russia’s existing network.” '^^ * Today the US 
shows commitment to multiple pipelines, which would exclude Russia and Iran as far as 
possible from dominating all future pipeline decisions.^“^  ^The multiple pipeline strategy 
was declared to be anti-monopoly, not anti-Russia.^^” Moreover, one of the US arguments 
is that multiple pipelines approach would also reduce the environmental risks associated 
with increased oil traffic through the Bosphorus.^^' Hence, the US government gives 
priority to Ceyhan pipeline largely because it bypasses Russia and Iran, though the 
business community has heavily criticized the project as commercially unviable, because 
the Caspian has not supplied enough oil to justify the pipeline’s estimated US$2.4 to 
US$3.7 billion cost.^^  ^ Kazakhstan is also adhered to the multioptional approach in oil 
transportation^^^. It understands that the diversification of transportation routes could 
enhance the security of oil and gas shipments from the Caspian region to the international
Weir Fred, “Russia wary of postwar US goals”, (2001).248
'^*’ lbid., p. 132.
B. Lynn Pascoe, “Security, Stability, Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line Affairs”, (September 
20, 2002), see also online http://www.state.gOv/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639.htm.
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number of accidents and the prospect of increased Caspian oil led Turkey to propose in 1993 new safety 
rules, which the International Maritime Organization (IMO) approved. Turkey’s environmental concerns 
about the potential increase in traffic through the Straits are understandable. See Testimony of Hon. 
Federico Pena Secretary, Department of Energy Committee on International Relations, US Committee on 
International Relations full hearing, “The US Role in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, (April 21-30, 1998), 
also online http://www.house.gov/iiiternational_relations/full/ws43081.htm.
Nancy Lubin, “Pipe Dreams: Potential Impacts of Energy Exploitation”, (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 67. 
While the US government is strongly promoting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, it can provide only limited 
financial assistance, and is constrained by the powerful Greek-American and Armenian-American lobbies 
who oppose the whole initiative on the grounds that it strengthens their age-old adversaries, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan.
Dastan Eleukhenov, “Perspectives on security in Kazakhstan”, in G. Bcrtsch, C. Craft, S. Jones, and M. 
Beck (eds.). Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
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market, develop healthy economic competition and eventually reduce energy prices for 
consumers.^ “^*
2.3.2.3 The US vision fo r Dispute Settlement: the Caspian Sea Legal Status
Before 1991 the Caspian Sea was used only by two states -  the USSR and Iran. 
However, after the break-up of the Soviet Union five littoral states faced with the 
problem of dividing the Caspian Sea on sectors, which would give them right to explore 
and exploit each share independently. The legal status of the Caspian is important 
because the exploration rights would differ depending on the status: if the Caspian is to 
be divided under the 'border lake’ concept, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would get more 
than twice the amount that Russia would enjoy under the same concept of allocation; 
under the 'enclosed sea ’ concept, however, the gap is somewhat reduced; and under the 
Russian 45-mile proposal, most Azeri offshore oil would be transferred to collective 
ownership^^^. There is no historical precedent that can present a solution to the Caspian
Sea status 256
Gawdat Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics o f the Caspian Sea Region”, (August 2002), p. 
323.
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Predicament, (2000), p. 54.
Ibid., p. 49. There is a fact of an exclusive Russian naval military and naval presence for about 200 years 
and the signing o f a number o f treaties between Russia/Soviet Union and Persia/Iran concerning freedom of 
navigation, maritime activity and trade in the Caspian Sea. While Russia has been quick to use the 1921 
and 1940 treaties to make its point, especially with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, that the Caspian is an 
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Russia puts forward an argument that there should be 20-mile exclusive economic
zone, with common ownership of the central area of the Caspian. If Russia succeeds in its
argument it would negatively affect the political independence of the newly independent
states because the condominium approach would definitely strengthen the stance of
regional power, giving it a veto right to undercut all the international investment helping
Central Asian countries to break free from Russian political and economic pressures.^^^
Kazakhstan advocates establishing a condominium regime only with regards to
navigation, fishing, and ecological cooperation. Its principled position is based on the
exclusive economic zones formed by central line equidistance from points on coastline:
“delineating the seabed and its resources among all Caspian nations, which 
would have an exclusive right for the survey and exploitation of mineral 
resources, laying pipelines and cables in their respective economic zones. In this 
case, outer zone borders lie along the median line from the shores of coastal 
states, while side borders are drawn from the point of the land border crossing the 
shoreline perpendicular to the median line.”^^ *
The United States strongly objects to the condominium approach since it would 
bring Russia and Iran into a picture. The US government proposed to adopt a legal 
regime in the Caspian Sea, which divides seabed resources through clearly established 
property rights and unrestricted transportation. This dispute resolution would assist 
development of cross-Caspian pipelines, speed investment, and enhance regional 
cooperation.^^^ The US is highly interested in the thorough resolution of this dispute. As 
Strobe Talbott once said:
Croissant, M.P. and C.M. Croissant, “Caspian Sea Status Dispute: Azerbaijani Perspectives”, Caucasian 
Regional Studies, Vol. 3 (1), 1998, also online [http://poli.vub.ac.be/public/crs/eng/0301-01.htm], (30 
December 1999).
Dastan Eleukhenov, “Perspectives on security in Kazakhstan”, in G. Bertsch, C. Craft, S. Jones, and M. 
Beck (eds.), Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
(2000), pp. 249-250.
Ambassador Eizenstat, “US Economic and Strategic interests in the Caspian Sea region: Policies and 
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“The United States has a stake in the success of the Caucasus and Central Asian 
nations [which posses] estimated 200 billion barrels of oil. That is yet another 
reason why conflict resolution must be Job One for US policy in the region: it is 
both the prerequisite for and accompaniment to energy development.
2.3.3 The US Investment Policy
Kazakhstan -  as a country possessing vast natural resources and having a 
relatively secure legal and political environment became the most attractive of the Soviet 
successor states for foreign investment.^^' The further internal development, deep 
macroeconomic reforms and democratization would only speed up future economic 
prosperity and integration into the world economy.
Today Central Asian states receive financial help not only from foreign countries 
but also from the international financial institutions such as EBRD, International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. For the last 18 months, total amount of financial 
operations, conducted by EBRD in Kazakhstan, has considerably increased, so, in June 
1999, EBRD investments constituted US$440 millions^^^. And Kazakhstan’s IMFAVorld 
Bank recovery program is the largest in the reg ion .However ,  foreign observers often 
criticize IMF loans and its ‘liberalization’ programs, arguing that:
260 Details US Approach to Caucasus, Central Asia”, USIA (US Information Agency) Wireless
Files. (22 July 1997), p. 22.
Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign policy, and Regional Security, 
(1996), p. 75. Thus by early 1994, some 19.6 percent o f all investments in these countries had been pledged 
to Kazakhstan, compared to Russia’s 31 percent. See also Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji 
Watanabe, The new Central Asia: in search of Stability, (2000), pp. 23-24. Kazakhstan received about $1.1 
billion in net FDl inflows in 1996, with the US the largest source o f investment. In 1997, that figure rose 
modestly to $1.3 billion, with South Korea leading the way. More than 80% of FDI in 1993-97 was in 
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R. M. Kalieva, “Zhenshina i Politika Kazahstana na rubezhe vekov”, Pravitelstvennii Vestnik, No. 10,
(1999) , p. 45.
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“an economy open to foreign penetration and control, sharp cutbacks in services 
to the general population, etc. these measures place power even more firmly in 
the hands of the wealthy classes and foreign investors ( ‘stability’) and reinforce 
the classic two-tiered societies o f the Third World -  the super-rich (and a 
relatively well-off professional class that serves them) and an enormous mass of  
impoverished, suffering people.”^^
Another side of critique is that subsidies tend to be habit-forming and cause 
lamentable economic and social effects.^^^ Needless to say, that among other negative 
side effects of foreign capital wide participation in Kazakhstani economy, there is a risk 
of irrational usage of natural resources with harmful ecological consequences^^^. For 
example, JSC ‘Tengizshevroil” is considered as the main air polluter in the region. In 
1998, its air pollution share constituted 68 percent out of the total amount of waste in the 
region, and, in 1999, 75 thousand tones of waste were thrown out, while the yearly limit 
allowed only for 36 thousand tones^^^. Also more loans mean the increase of external 
debt of the country. Thus, for example, in 1996, Kazakhstan was already spending nearly 
10 percent of its budget revenues on servicing its external debt, and as a result cut all 
social programs.^^*
Among investing countries, the main donor became the United States. 
Ambassador Eizenstat stated that the United States is encouraging Central Asian
countries to adopt open, fair, and transparent investment regimes which would create 
favorable climates for US companies to participate directly in the development of the 
region’s energy resources, and would bring environmentally sound technology and
Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, (1997), p. 32.
Peter Bauer and Anthony Daniels, “US Foreign Aid Harms Other Nations’’, in David Bender and Bruno 
Leone (eds.), American Foreign Policy: Opposing Viewpoints, (Opposing Viewpoints Series, Greenhaven 
Press, 1993), p. 135.
R. M. Kalieva, Respiiblika Kazakstan I Sovremennii Mir, (Astana: Elorda, 2000), p. 148.
Ibid.267
Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs o f Short-Term Gains”, in Robert Ebel and 
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practices to the countries in the region.^^^ The US boasts that its financial aid supported 
economic and democratic reforms in Central Asia, provided technical assistance and 
training programs in different spheres, such as business development, privatization, tax 
and financial policy etc.^ *^* The main source of direct US aid was Freedom Support Act. 
Also the US assisted through Nunn-Lugar Fund for denuclearization, defense and 
security programs, and other sources.
However American public is highly divided in its opinion about foreign aid. The 
advocates of the US financial aid argue that “foreign aid remains an extension of the 
American character; [as long as they] are a compassionate people who find it morally 
indefensible to accept poverty, sickness, and unfulfilled human potential”; and 
“America’s generosity toward fellow nations is quite simply unprecedented in the history 
of the world”. The followers of this view see many positive sides in US assistance to 
the Central Asian countries, like: enhancement of the sovereignty of the states and their 
ties with the West; prevention of Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by 
encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia and promote energy
security through diversified supplies; encouragement of US allies, particularly Turkey.272
As for the opponents of foreign aid, they claimed that it has played destructive 
role in instigating wars and giving nations an opportunity to afford the expensive arms
 ^ Ambassador Eizenstat, “US Economic and Strategic interests in the Caspian Sea region: Policies and 
Implications”, (October 23,1997), p. 14.
Lubin, Nancy “Central Asia: Issues and Challenges for United States Policy”, in A. Banuazizi and M. 
Weiner (eds.). The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), p. 270. Agreements with 
lending institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and US Eximbank 
complement these efforts by providing direct loans and guarantees, assisting with project-investor financing 
and, in the case o f Eximbank, providing short-term insurance coverage to projects in these countries.
Richard Bissell, “Foreign Aid Benefits the United States”, in David Bender and Bruno Leone (eds.), 
American Foreign Policy: Opposing Viewpoints, (1993), p. 143.
CRS Report to Congress, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for US Interests”, by Jim 
Nichol, (August 30,1999), p. 19, also online http://www.fpc.gov/crscenas.htm.
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conflicts, which they have been fighting^’ ;^ and while assisting foreign nations, the
United States depletes its own financial resources, neglects its domestic problems, and
bolsters the economies of its com pet i to rsSom e  critics went even far in their accusing
views, saying: “How can we honestly explain to the American public that their hard-
earned tax dollars are now being sent to a country which we have called our enemy for
over 40 years, when in our own country we are experiencing record unemployment,
increased racial tension, skyrocketing infant mortality rates, woeful underfunding of
education and a crumbling national infrastmcture?” ’^^
Nonetheless, in spite of all critique, the US Government decided to increase its
assistance and business activities throughout the region to support American companies
and continue to bring US companies to this market. These assistance programs were
sharply focused on improving commercial and legal infrastructure to create a climate
conducive to foreign investment. In any case, both sides -  the US and Kazakhstan -
should remember that the only financial help is not enough to bring prosperity to the
state, consequently, the whole internal structure of the state and the society should be
thoroughly reconsidered. As Dr. Peter Bauer^^^ has precisely noticed:
“What holds back many poor countries is the people who live there, including 
their governments. A society which cannot develop without external gifts is 
altogether unlikely to do so with them... if the conditions for development other 
than capital are present, capital will be generated locally or supplied to 
governments or to business commercially from abroad. If the required conditions 
are not present, aid will be unproductive and therefore ineffective. Where the
Robert Lee, “Foreign Aid Harms the United States”, in David Bender and Bruno Leone (eds.), American 
Foreign Policy: Opposing Viewpoints, (1993), p. 153. For instance, during the India-Pakistan war of the 
early 1960s, America supplied aid to both sides, which used US-supplied weapons against each other, each 
side hating Americans for helping the other side.
^^ “ibid., p. 148.
Dennis DeConcini and Robert Byrd, ‘The US Should Not Aid the Former Soviet Republics”, in David 
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mainsprings of progress are present, material progress will come about without 
foreign aid.”^^^
2.4 Preserving the Environment: Implications for US Policy
In the second half of the 19^*^ century Central Asia started to lose its
environmental balance when Russia invaded the region with the goal to find gold and to
grow cotton.^^^ Later the demand of Moscow’s central planners for more cotton led to
the creation of a ruinous monoculture in much of the region’s fertile area^^ :^
“To supply a new crop, cotton, water has been siphoned off since the 1960  ^from 
the two main rivers that feed the Central Asian region, and the Aral Sea -  once 
the forth-largest inland sea in the world -  has now shrunk to about a third of its 
1960 volume, and half its 1960 geographical size. Huge salt and dust storms, 
heavy salinization of the surrounding land and water, and soaring rates of 
intestinal and respiratory disease now abound in what was once a relatively 
health area.”^^ ’
To be more precise, between 1960 and 1987, the level of the Aral Sea decreased 
by more than 40 feet in depth, 40 percent in surface area and 66 percent in volume. This 
catastrophic volume decrease has resulted in an extreme increase of salt content (28 times 
the former 1 gram per liter), killing fish and consequently the fisheries and fish- 
processing industry. The sea, which had supported three million people, no longer 
supports any. Current predictions suggest that it could disappear completely by the year
Robert Lee, “Foreign Aid Harms the United States”, in David Bender and Bruno Leone (eds.), American 
Foreign Policy: Opposing Viewpoints, (1993), p.l54.
Friedemann Muller, “Polluted Potential: Ecology and the Economy in Central Asia”, Harvard 
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2005. However, the most damage came from the salty topsoil left by the receding sea, 
200.000 tons of which is distributed by storms over hundreds of miles every day 
destroying fertile agricultural land. Thus the Karakum and the Kysulkum deserts are 
merging and growing by 11.000 km^ per year.^*  ^ Now it is very difficult to restore the 
ecosystem and stop further deterioration of entire ecological situation of the region. Over 
and above, Aral Sea catastrophe made a devastating impact not only on ecology but also 
on human health: “high infant mortality and morbidity rates, a sharp increase in 
esophageal cancer directly attributable to ‘poisoned’ water resources, gastrointestinal 
problems, typhoid, and high rates of congenital deformation.” ®^'^
The Aral Sea disaster is not the only ecological devastation in Central Asia. 
Kazakhstan suffers from widespread nuclear contamination due to uranium production, 
nuclear tests conducted near Semipalatinsk^®^, and millions of tons of inadequately stored 
nuclear waste^® .^ Since 1949, 10 million hectares of Kazakhstani soil was used as nuclear 
test sites, being the world’s second biggest polygon after Nevada (USA); and where out 
of 717 nuclear tests conducted in the USSR approximately 500 took place on 
Semipalatinsk polygon. Later neither Soviet Ministry of Defense, nor local authorities 
had money to compensate ecological harm, to move people from the dangerous zone, or 
even to buy necessary medicaments^®’. Moreover, apart from domestically generated
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radiation the eastern part of Kazakhstan, from Almaty to the Chinese border, is 
downwind of the Chinese nuclear test site Lob Nor.^ ^® And other potential ecological 
problem could come from the Caspian region, where careless oil exploitation could cause 
the ruination of the Caspian’s unique ecosystem and an accompanying irreversible 
environmental catastrophe.^*^
Now the United States helps ex-Soviet countries to deal with the awful ecological 
catastrophes caused by 70 years of communists’ bad management.^^*  ^ For example, the 
US granted $15 million to deal with Aral disaster, particularly to supply medical 
equipment to diagnostic center in Kizilorda, to solve problem with clean drinking water,
9QIand to ensure control over water supply in the region.
All these problems should be addressed on the global level, as long as local 
efforts were in vain. However, the main threat to international cooperation on the global 
environmental issues is the question of payment for the necessary improvements. In 
this respect, the United States shouldn’t be considered as the only source of financial
Friedemann Muller, “Polluted Potential: Ecology and the Economy in Central Asia”, (Spring 1993), p. 
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solution. America is rethinking its leadership role in the world at the moment and US
priorities among global environmental issues. As Jessica Tuchman Mathews suggested:
“On some issues it will be appropriate for the US to pave the way, to provide an 
example, even perhaps a success story. In certain circumstances, as in the 1978 
banning of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) use in aerosols, unilateral action may prove 
beneficial. In others it may well impede an international response. The US should 
choose those areas in which it will exercise strong leadership. At the same time it 
should do what it can to erase the expectations that international solutions in 
every arena depend on its leadership. It should expect and encourage others to 
take the lead in certain areas, but without reverting in those issues to either 
hostility or passivity.” ’^^
It seems that regional and quasi-regional organizations - such as the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE)^ '^* -  could be of much help. Furthermore, the private sector, including both 
the corporate community and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), should be of 
greater use. The US, possessing the strongest, best-funded, and most diverse NGO 
community in the world, plays a key role in pioneering new models of collaboration.^^^ In 
accordance with preliminary estimations, “clean-up and regeneration of a balanced water 
system will cost at least US$100 billion.”^^  ^ This price tag is too expensive for the 
Central Asian states, and only extraordinary combined effort could provide the capital to 
pay off this debt.
Ibid., p. 89. 
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CHAPTER III. US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD KAZAKHSTAN: 
SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
3.1 Regional and Internal Obstacles in Kazakhstan for the US Involvement
3.1.1 The Role o f Regional Powers in Kazakhstan: Russia-China-Turkey 
Triangle
Russia
After the collapse of the USSR it was difficult for Russia to get used to the idea 
that it was losing its irnperial influence. Previously subordinate republics became 
independent and started developing new political courses alienating from Moscow. At 
the beginning Russia was trying to preserve the unity among newly independent states 
making it plain that it viewed the entire space of the former Soviet Union as a zone of 
Kremlin’s special geostrategic interest, from which outside political -  and even economic 
-  influence should be excluded.^^’ However, at this stage Russia faced a dilemma, it was 
too weak politically and financially to prevent outside powers from extending their 
sphere of influence in the region. For example, Russian government, under the 
reformist Yegor Gaidar, regarded Central Asia as an economic burden while Russia was 
trying to reform its own economy.^^^
At that time Russian political circles were divided in their approach toward ‘near 
abroad’: the Atlanticists (sometimes called Westemizers) - like Shevamadze, Andrei
According to Brzezinski to accomplish that goal, Russia is discouraging the new states from creating 
their own separate armies, from fostering the use o f their distinctive languages, from cultivating close ties 
with outsiders, and from developing new pipelines directly to outlets in the Arabian and Mediterranean 
Seas. Sec Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 
Imperatives, (1997), p. 136.
^^*lbid„ p. 141.
Lena Jonson, “Russia and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: 
The New International Context, (2001), p. 96-97.
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Kozyrev, the then Russian Foreign Minister - were firm to break up with the Soviet past 
completely linking their new relationship with the Western world with democratic 
tradition^”®; the Eurasianists (sometimes called ‘national patriots’ and mostly represented 
by the Parliament) perceived Russia more as a Eurasian ‘super-power’ with its far-going 
imperial ambitions rather than as a part of the Western world.^* '^ Many other 
contradictions between the executive and legislative powers, the clash between ambitions 
of politicians and military circles complicated the working out of clear-cut objectives and 
the defined strategy toward Central Asian region.
However finally Russia clearly defined its long-term interests in Central Asia: the 
fate of the Russian diaspora in the ‘near abroad’; political and economic stability (the 
absence of interstate and internal conflicts and acute economic crises); the maintenance 
of economic and political relationships with Central Asian republics via CIS institutions 
and the prevention of a power vacuum that could be filled with forces hostile to Russia; 
the border security; the prevention of the spread of chauvinism and Islamic extremism; 
the prevention of the spread of terrorism, drug-trafficking and arms smuggling; nuclear 
proliferation issues; Central Asia’s ecological security; the preservation of 
communications crossing Russia and access to new transport arteries and to oil and gas 
pipelines oriented to the ‘far abroad’; the further access to natural resources.^®^
Atlanticists saw Russia’s integration into European and global institutions through radical reforms and 
privatization. See also B. Rumer, “The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts”, in A. 
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Later in 1996, Russian government took on a pragmatic low-profile policy toward 
the CIS and shifted to bilateral agreements and functional cooperation on specific issues. 
In other words, differentiated policy evolved with regard to Central Asian republics.^®  ^
Kazakhstan, with its nuclear inheritance, large Russian-speaking population and a long 
common border with Russia (over 7,000 km), was strategically important to Moscow. For 
Russia, “Kazakhstan’s gradual subordination would have the geopolitical effect of almost 
automatically drawing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into Moscow’s sphere of control, while 
exposing both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to more direct Russian pressure.’’^ ”^  Russia 
highly values its relations with Kazakhstan, and, hence, jealously keeps an eye on 
increasing Western involvement and foreign investors’ activity in the neighboring state.
Turkey
For a long period Turkey’s membership in NATO was the best institutional 
anchor in the West emphasizing Ankara’s desire to become a member of the EC. 
However, the development of new geopolitical climate, by the end of the Cold War, 
made this membership problematic. Trying to find political opportunity to strengthen its 
international standing Turkey started considering the option of a unity with Central Asian 
states on the basis of their common Turkic origin.^®  ^ As interestingly Rumer noted, 
Turkey’s “ambition [was] fuelled not only by memories of lost empire and a desire to 
assert Turkish influence among ethnic kin, but also by the hope that leadership in Central
Lena Jonson, “Russia and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.). Central Asian Security: 
The New International Context, (2001), p. 97.
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Asia would enhance Ankara’s standing in Europe” ®^^. Thus, Turkey expanded its policy 
into new areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkish diplomats started promoting 
bilateral relations and tried to create new interstate relations putting forward Turkey’s 
development model, stressing ethnic kinship and offering mediatory services in contracts 
with the West.^ *^ ’
Economically Turkey had some advantages. Although it didn’t possess large 
assets of its own, Turkey was able to acquire financial capital for organizing large-scale 
projects, was prepared to take commercial risks, and was eager to provide a skilled work 
force.^®  ^ In order to expand its cultural, political, and economic ties with newly 
independent states Turkey exercised immediate initiatives in the region. Ironically at that 
time Turkish economy was weakened by high inflation, substantial budget deficit and 
difficulties in completing its privatization programme.^^^ Consequently, the reality 
modified euphoric pronouncements and soon Turkey had to backtrack on some of its 
pledges about expensive economic aid.
Appreciating Turkey’s desire to help, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia 
emphasized their “strong sense of distinctiveness” '^*^ . Although they shared a common 
Turkic origin, they preferred to assert their own individual identity rather than being 
submerged within a broader cultural and political umbrella.^" Anyway, Central Asian
B. Rumer, “The Potential for Political Instability and Regional Conflicts”, in A. Banuazizi and M. 
Weiner (eds.). The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands, (1994), p. 69.
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republics shouldn’t ignore the successful example of Turkish “relatively dynamic market 
economy, secular government, respect of Islamic traditions and a democratic system”  ^
which could serve as one of the suitable models for the young republics. In 1992, clearly 
understanding this fact. President Nazarbayev said; “we want to implement a free market, 
and the suitable model we have is Turkey.”^
In November 1992, cooperation between Turkey and the five Central Asian 
republics - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan - 
received another impetus: the Ankara Declaration was signed. The political part of the 
document stated “the will of the parties to strengthen security in the region, to promote 
the settlement of regional conflicts, and to pursue agreed policies on the international 
arena” *^'*. The economic clauses fixed conditions for cooperation in the fields of 
technology and communications, putting into operation joint projects in the oil and gas 
industries. Turkey encouraged Central Asian states’ membership in regional economic 
associations and prospects for free zones, which would make the current transition period
easier and quicker 316
China
In the twentieth century, humanity witnessed two great historic events in Eurasia: 
the collapse of the Russian Empire and the Soviet communist system; and, the rapid 
growth of China’s economy and its military power. Historically, China had always good
Zviagelskaya Irina, “Central Asia and Transcaucasia: New Geopolitics”, in V. Naumkin (ed.), Central 
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and friendly relations with Central Asian states trying to follow 5 core principles of 
peaceful coexistence: peace; cooperation and development; exchange; mutual prosperity; 
progress and understanding.^The Silk Road was the first cornerstone of close ties 
between peoples of this region. '^® Since that time friendship between China and Central 
Asian countries has only flourished.
In such close collaboration, China has not only geographical advantages but also 
other positive factors, such as “a regulated economy, which is more compatible with the 
economies of the Central Asian republics, a secular state, and available financial
»>319means.” Chinese economic miracle is an excellent example of achieving rapid 
modernization without sacrificing political control and successful economic transition 
from socialism and a command economy, which could be a valuable experience for 
Central Asian states, so poorly prepared to the privatization process and the transition to a 
market economy.^^®
Cooperation with China could be a very attractive venture to Kazakhstan. Given 
that China has huge population, export-import potential, rapidly growing industry and big 
demand for energy resources, it could be a “a lucrative market for Kazakhstan’s gas-and 
oil-dependent economy and is able to replace Russian imports with its cheaper basic 
consumer goods.”^^ ' Cooperation with China would help Kazakhstan to join the economy
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of Asia faster. Thus Kazakhstani-Chinese bilateral trade has been soaring since 1992.^^  ^
China even proposed Kazakhstan to use its territory to gain access to the Pacific and to 
the Far East Asia.^^  ^ China is an ideal provider of low-cost, low-technology approaches, 
which could be useful in agriculture, industry, and infrastructure development.^^"^
But on the other hand, China has a potential to become a major threat to Central 
Asia, taking into account its massive power potential and intention to maintain its nuclear 
test programme in the areas bordering Central Asia.^^  ^ Moreover, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are “suspicious about Chinese objectives because it laid down 
claims to large parts of their territory during the 1970s and 1980s, while the area was still 
part of the Soviet Union.”^^  ^ Chinese government had fostered an ambitious idea to 
expand in Central Asia via ‘peaceful means’, like incorporation of lands and assimilation 
of native population^^^. Thus, the common 1700-km long Sino-Kazakh border was a 
vulnerable issue in Kazakhstan’s national security for a long time, given also that “the 
Chinese armed forces located in the region are superior in armament and number to the
Reports from the Chinese news agency, Xinhua, indicated total foreign trade in 1992 increased to more 
than $500 million. Exports and imports that went through regular channels jumped by 130 percent to about 
$300 million. Meanwhile, during the first eleven months o f 1992, what China classified as local or border 
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armed forces of Russia and the CIS countries located in Central Asia.'^^^” Furthermore, in 
the framework of trade activities, Kazakhstan is anxiously watching Chinese traders’ 
move into the c o u n t r y . S o m e  Kazakh observers worry that China seeks control over 
Central Asia’s resources and territory through the growing number of Chinese ‘suitcase’ 
traders and immigrants.^^** Another Kazakhstani fear is the possible secession of a part of 
its Eastern territory in the case of Uighur separatism in Xinjiang that would spread among 
Uighurs living in Kazakhstan, and result in alteration of Kazakh borders creating a 
unified Uighur “East Turkestan’’^ '^.
The three above-mentioned countries are the core ‘players’ in the region, which 
are able to influence further development of the Central Asian states and fill-in power 
vacuum, leaving no space for radicalization and unfavorable development of the newly 
independent societies.
Both, Russia and China, are interested in a stable Central Asia beyond Western 
influence, considering themselves as ‘a factor of stability’ in this context, and being 
suspicious about all Western initiatives in the region^^^. This fearful attitude toward 
Western involvement hindered US assistance. However this stance did not frustrate 
American officials who preferred to stay in good terms with Central Asian states “in the
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bear’s backyard”, while Russia’s future direction has being anybody’s guess.^^^ In this 
rivalry Turkey has taken the American side in constraining Russia and China’s intentions 
to diminish US active involvement.^ '^* Through promoting Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, 
Turkey and the United States were counting to cease Russian monopoly on pipeline 
routes. However, this struggle for influence in Central Asia among regional powers and 
the United States put Kazakhstan into uncomfortable position experiencing sometimes 
political and economic pressure from these states.
In the essence, keeping in mind the specific character and complexity of the 
region, all outside powers should admit that diversification of foreign political and 
economic contacts could assist in a relatively quiet and peaceful entry of Central Asian 
republics into the international community.^^^ Thus the Presidents of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan while perceiving Russia as the final guarantor of stability in Central Asia, 
which is a lot nearer than the United States, try to foster geopolitical pluralism in the 
region via diversification of their security ties with external powers in order to forestall 
Russian hegemony. At the same time, increased activity of external actors in Central Asia 
shouldn’t belittle sovereignty of the newly independent states. In no circumstances 
outside involvement should cross the borders of humanitarian aid and professional 
assistance transferring into imperial ambitions. Each major state claiming to have ‘vital 
interests’ in Central Asia should not ignore interests and concerns of other states, paving 
the ground for cooperative arrangements. Only in the framework of mutual respect all 
subjects of international relations could benefit.
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3.1.2 Internal State Peculiarities to Hinder Full US Involvement
The young independent republic -  Kazakhstan -  had many obstacles to overcome, 
and many new things to learn in order to restructure old models of economy and system 
of governance, to foster new legal norms, to alter people’s mentality, and to democratize 
the whole society. During this difficult period the country was in deep need of external 
help, not only financial but also humanitarian and educational. Western powers, 
especially the US, were eager to share their positive experience and to assist Kazakhstan 
in building a new society. However the US faced with the number of difficulties ‘on-the- 
grounds’, which somehow complicated and slowed down cooperation between two 
countries.
First and foremost, the new state had a considerable disadvantage -  “the lack of 
an experienced elite capable of developing domestic or international policies independent 
of Moscow.”^^  ^Moreover, when Kazakhstani high officials traveled abroad, they rarely 
had any prior briefing about their destinations, “since none of these republics had any sort 
of diplomatic representation and few of their citizens had even served in the Soviet 
diplomatic corps.”^^ ^
From another side, foreign investors sometimes expressed their doubts to invest 
money in the region with high possibility of ethno-territorial conflicts. Some observers, 
like Naumkin, Porkhomovsky, considered that:
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“The conflicts taking place within the post-Soviet zone differ from other regional 
and internal conflicts. In some cases, they are developing within the borders of 
the CIS, which may be considered a regional organization now, but there are 
instances when the conflicts have a direct impact on the CIS countries because of 
common borders. Other important factors have a role to play, including the 
presence of ethnic minorities and common communications and power systems. 
The interdependence of all the republics of the former USSR ... contributes to 
their high degree of involvement in any of such conflicts.”^^®
Border issue made the Central Asian states concerned about the flow of refugees 
and displaced persons from Afghanistan, including armed bands, the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and the increased smuggling of drugs and weapons.^^^
Another obstacle for successful development lies in the legal sphere, where the 
laws are changing and the relevant statutes are being improved slowly, so that foreign 
businessmen face difficulties in adjusting.^ "*® At the moment, Kazakhstani Parliament 
tries to work out this shortcoming putting much effort into it.
And still there is a widespread fear that corruption and clan-politics would 
speculate on oil and gas money '^*'. Kazakh Prosecutor General, in June 1999, denounced, 
“corruption has penetrated all areas of economic and political life.” Thus his office 
successfully prosecutes, disciplines, and obtains dismissals of officials for corruption 
related offences.^"^^
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All above-mentioned shortcomings are not the only ones to be improved. 
Although it is natural that the newly independent republic could have many difficulties 
on its way to the successful development, hopefully, international community would be 
more tolerant and helpful in guiding Kazakhstan toward better future for all.
3.2 Critical Evaluation of the US Undertakings in Kazakhstan
3.2.1 Concrete US Actions and Bilateral Cooperation
The framework of this work does not allow to outline the whole spectrum of 
bilateral cooperation between the US and Kazakhstan, and to go into details of all 
activities and projects. Only some of them are mentioned in this chapter to give a sense of 
close cooperation in different spheres.
Development stages of the US-Kazakhstani bilateral partnership were based on 
the five high level official meetings: May 1992, February 1994, November 1997, 
December 1999, and December 2001^'^. Accordingly several bilateral documents, signed 
during these meetings, laid down the legal fundament for further collaboration: Charter 
on Democratic Partnership, Economic Partnership Program, Joint Presidential 
Communiqué on New US-Kazakhstan Relations, Energy Partnership Declaration, 
Memorandum on Economic Cooperation and Foreign Assistance^“*^ .
Moreover, several treaties and agreements became the crucial legal start-point for 
further business activities. For example, a Bilateral Investment Treaty (signed in May,
K. Tokayev, “Parlnerstvo v Epohu Peremen”, Kazahstanskaya Pravda, (27 April 2002).
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1992) provided legal protection and assurances for US investors, including treatment at 
least as favorable as that given to domestic enterprises^^^; an Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) Agreement (signed on 19 May, 1992) encouraged US private 
investment by providing direct loans and loan guarantees and by assisting with project- 
investor financing; a Trade Agreement (signed in February, 1993) provided for reciprocal 
most-favored-nation treatment and created commercial opportunities for US business and 
emerged Kazakhstani enterprises, facilitated business by allowing free operation of 
commercial representation in each country and offered strong protection of intellectual 
property^"^’; Statement o f Intent on Funding o f Feasibility Studies on Cooperative 
Projects between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan confirmed that the US Trade and Development Agency 
(TDA) had approved non-reimbursable grants totaling over $2,500,000 to Kazakhstani 
enterprises and organizations to fund feasibility studies on projects in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, and both sides acknowledged that the primary spheres of cooperation could 
be the mining and metallurgical industry, agribusiness, the oil and gas industry, and 
defense conversion.^"^  ^Also Presidents of both countries worked out Houston Initiative to 
increase the level of entrepreneurship in Kazakhstan. Today out of the total amount of 
direct foreign investments one-third belongs to American companies. To be more precise 
gigantic American companies, such as Chevron Corp, ExxonMobil Corp, Texaco Inc, 
Phillips Petroleum Co, Citibank Ink, and JP Morgan Chase & Co. invest more than $4
346 BIT provided also guarantees o f unrestricted transfer, non-performance requirements, and full access to 
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billions out of $14 billions of the total investment amount in Kazakhstan^“*^ . More than 
350 joint companies and more than 100 representations of American firms were 
registered in Kazakhstan^^®.
While developing free markets and business relations the US launched several 
programs, such as: Farmer-to-farmer Program -  to provide opportunities for US experts 
to give hands-on expertise on Western agribusiness methods; Eurasia Foundation -  to 
provide a forum for cultural exchange and learning, and to provide ‘on-the-ground’ 
mechanism in the areas of management and privatization; American Business Centers 
where US business people could come for advice on local business opportunities, 
translation services, and meeting facilities, with a goal of facilitating expanded 
commercial relations; Health Care Partnership -  to transfer American knowledge and 
technology through the establishment of hospital-to-hospital partnership; Coal Mine 
Safety Project -  to provide assistance on coal mine safety in the Karaganda Basin.^^'
In the sphere of US technical assistance some other initiatives could be 
mentioned: SABİT (Special American Business Intern Training Program, managed by the 
Department of Commerce) -  to arrange 3-6 month management training program in the 
US; lESC (International Executive Service Corps) -  to send to Kazakhstan volunteers- 
executives to provide a range of technical assistance; Loaned Executives Program of 
USDA (US Department of Agriculture) - to place US agribusiness executives in 
Kazakhstan to work in Kazakh enterprises; International Resident Housing Advisers 
Program -  to provide expertise to private individuals and public sector institutions on the 
development of a private sector housing market; Rule o f Law Program - to bring judges
349 ,
350
351
Takoi Posol Nam Ne Nuzhen”, Vremya Po, (24 July 2001).
K. Tokayev, “Partnerstvo v Epohu Peremen”, (27 April 2002). 
“US-Kazakhstan Relations”, (25 May, 1992), p. 402.
95
and legal experts from Kazakhstan to the US for trainings and seminars; an American Bar 
Association Technical Assistance Program - to provide legal experts who could assist 
Kazakhstan in drafting constitutional and other laws.^^^
3.2.2 Failures and Flaws o f US Foreign Policy in Kazakhstan
In the previous chapters, some flaws of US policy and its negative consequences 
were already highlighted, however, in the present chapter this issue is given special 
attention. Weak and sometimes erroneous knowledge about Central Asian region, the 
lack of familiarity with the region’s complexities, the lack of consent among various 
executive organs, the bureaucratic wrangling over jurisdictions and attempts by various 
domestic lobbying groups to push their own regional interests complicated the 
formulating of coherent policy toward ex-Soviet states and led to many mistakes and 
failures when US initiatives were held ‘on-the-grounds’. Moreover different US official 
organs and executive offices were unclear on the matter of their particular responsibilities 
with regard to the Central Asian region. For example, the State Department, the 
Commerce Department and USAID were fighting over which bureau would administer 
the Freedom Support Act. Such disorganization hindered real progress. Thus, US 
businesses, despite the lifting of restrictions on Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) guarantees, could not even fill out an application form to apply for such aid.^^  ^
Apart from finding consensus among executive organs and defining their particular 
responsibilities with regard to Central Asia, the US policy-makers had to settle the
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domestic disagreement between US ‘oilers’ and ‘geopoliticians’. This disagreement 
further hampered the clarification of US policy toward Central Asia and the working out 
o f the oil pipeline strategy in the Caspian region.
Also the US didn’t want to admit ‘geopolitical pluralism’ though stable 
relations in the region required close cooperation not only with Turkey but also with 
Russia, China, and Iran. In accordance with Shireen T. Hunter’s view, four factors 
emphasized the necessity of ‘geopolitical pluralism’ and the limited extent of US 
involvement: a high degree of asymmetry in US and Kazakhstani security interests, 
especially toward Russia, China and some regional states, including Iran; the proximity 
o f Russia and the remoteness of the United States - the risk for Kazakhstan to be “left at 
the mercy of its neighbors, should the distant power lose interest”; the US inability to 
provide large enough resources to completely restructure Kazakhstan’s physical 
infrastmcture and thus reduce Russia’s domination, deriving from the organic links that it 
had developed over two centuries; certain differences between US objectives in Central 
Asia and elsewhere, particularly the Middle East^^^. For example, the Central Asian 
countries were deprived of many alternative transport, pipeline, and communications 
networks because of the US sanctions isolating Iran. This situation only strengthened 
Central Asia’s dependence on Russia.^^^
According to Fiona Hill, US focus on Caspian oil and security issues “has been to 
the detriment of overall political and economic development [transforming] governments 
into cormpt oligarchies that have enriched themselves with wealth generated through
Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: In Search of Stability, 
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control of energy resources.”^^  ^ Enormous investment flow mostly was directed on 
developing energy sector, which deprived other economic sectors of vital financing and 
caused their underdevelopment. Although the US offered public sector loans and 
insurances, other infrastructure development projects failed to move ahead because of the 
lack of private and public sector financing, especially when US government refused to 
subsidize construction.^^® Thus, US policy and some major projects “have been widely 
criticized for being misguided, redundant, ill-fitted to Central Asian realities and costing 
the US taxpayers millions of dollars to generate few significant results.”®^^
US officials have already admitted that stakes in Central Asia go far beyond 
questions of oil and gas alone®^, so they try to work out more suitable strategy toward 
the region. Consequently, in order “to understand the informal workings of Central 
Asian societies and the schisms and pressure points that [could] lead to instability today 
and in the future” , much deeper research is needed.
3.2.3 To what Extent Was the United States Successful in Achieving its 
Goals?
Despite some policy failures, the US had many successful achievements in the 
Central Asian region. For example, it helped Kazakhstan implement one of the most 
modem and transparent tax reform laws in the NIS, and to deal with ambitious
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privatization program; the US encouraged the Central Asian states to establish ties with 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the Council of Europe, the European 
Union, the World Trade Organization and other international financial and political 
institutions; America assisted Central Asian states to develop “a Eurasian transportation 
corridor, to eliminate trade barriers among them, and to create a region-wide market 
through the Central Asian Free Economic Zone”; US funding and technical advice helped 
Central Asia overcome environmental degradation, such as the disaster that has befallen
the Aral Sea.^^^
Now Washington is shifting its focus in the region from humanitarian to 
development assistance, asking Congress to increase assistance by 34 percent to $900 
million. Needless to say, the US has budget limits, thus it is trying to work through the 
major financial institutions, such as the International Financial Institutions.^^^ Today the 
US offers substantial assistance through many existing programs in various fields, like 
public health, agriculture, environment protection and education. For example, English 
language instruction and translation is being provided effectively and at low cost through 
the US Peace Corps.^^ Moreover, US governmental programs such as the Information 
Agency’s Educational Exchange Program, the Fulbright Academic Exchange Program, 
the Humphrey Program and the Pell Environmental Exchange Program, coupled with the
Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, (July 21, 
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resources of American universities could assist Kazakhstan in achieving high world 
standards in the sphere of education.^^^
At the same time, reorganization process is happening inside US governmental 
structures as well. The reshaping of the world increased “the need for other departments 
and agencies of the US government to play an active role in pursuit of American interest 
abroad -  and for the State Department to cooperate more systematically with them.”^^  ^
As a result, governmental employers at the Human Resources Department had to rethink 
their way of recruitment and training. They started to hire people who already had 
experience in areas such as international finance, labor, environmental science, and law 
enforcement. Thus “the core curriculum in the training of entry-level officers” was
broadened.367
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CONCLUSION
Future Perspectives fo r  US-Kazakhstan Partnership
Even though the end of the twentieth century coincided with the end of the Cold 
War, we are still living in a bipolar world. But today, the dividing line “is not an iron 
curtain between East and West, [rather] it is between the forces of stability and 
instability, integration and disintegration, prosperity and poverty.” In this new struggle 
the US has a new role to play. Holding a ‘super-power’ status, the US has two goals: 
firstly, to avert global anarchy, and to impede the emergence of a power rival; and 
secondly, to forge an enduring framework of global geopolitical cooperation. The 
reality of international affairs dictates new rules for the US -  a multilevel set of policies -  
to respond adequately to the challenges of ‘new world order’ America highly 
evaluates its new world position. Zbigniew Brzezinski interestingly expressed his view 
on the part of American hegemony:
“Am erica is not only the first, as w ell as the only, truly global superpower, but it 
is also likely to be the very last. That is so  not only because nation-states are 
gradually becom ing more diffuse, more shared, and less constrained by national 
boundaries. Econom ic power is also likely to becom e more dispersed. In the 
years to com e, no single power is likely to reach the level o f  30 percent or so o f  
the world’s G DP that Am erica sustained throughout much o f  this century. ...  
M oreover, the very multinational and exceptional character o f  American society  
has made it easier for Am erica to universalize its hegem ony without letting it
appear to be a strictly national one. 5,371
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The increased number of regional powers with their independent foreign policy would hinder the 
development of absolute authority belonging only to one super-power. See N. A. Nazarbayev, Epitzentr 
Mira, (Astana: Elorda, 2001).
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Nevertheless, the exercise of American global primacy must be sensitive to other 
subjects of international relations. Hence, strengthening cooperation between the US and 
new independent states of Central Asia puts the first challenge before US policy-makers 
-  “to understand each country and its relations with its neighbors and the regional 
powers, [instead of] viewing Central Asia as ‘part of the former Soviet Union’, the ‘near 
abroad’ of Russia, or ‘part of the Muslim world’ The United States should not 
impose a false unity on Central Asian region and undermine the historical interests of the 
neighboring powers. In accordance with geostrategic implication, “America is too distant 
to be dominant in this part of Eurasia but too powerful not to be engaged”, especially 
when all Central Asian states view American engagement as vital to their survival. It is 
in America’s interest to maintain and to “perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism 
on the map of Eurasia”, understanding the limits of America’s effective power.^’"^
To summarize US-Kazakhstani bilateral relations from 1991 to 2002, at the 
beginning the US perceived the whole Central Asia as an ‘exotic region’ due to the lack 
of information about the region itself, its peculiarities, traditions and history, which posed 
a big difficulty for US decision-makers to formulate coherent and clear policy. The US 
companies were the first to take the risk of involvement with Central Asian states, 
especially after the rich Caspian Sea oil reserves were discovered. So the first oil 
contracts became a cornerstone for close collaboration and investment flows. Signing 
other agreements and treaties strengthened the legal basis for bilateral economic
372 Ariel Cohen, “Paving the Silk Road: US Interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, Harvard 
International Review, vol. XXII, no.l, (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 71.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 
(1997), p. 148.
374 Ibid.,p. 198.
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cooperation. Legal guarantees increased the confidence of foreign investors and provided 
reliable protection for their capital. Financial and professional assistance played the 
crucial role in strengthening Central Asian states’ sovereignty, building the free 
democratic societies with market economy, and helping these republics to become equal 
and respectful members of the international community.
In the case of Kazakhstan, the United States helped with the unprecedented 
voluntary renunciation of the huge nuclear potential, Caspian oil reserves exploration and 
transportation, overcoming a Russian monopoly over oil pipelines, political and 
economic reforms, the process of nation-building, military cooperation, counteracting 
drug-trafficking and training in border control, developing different sectors of 
Kazakhstani economy, environment protection. Kazakhstan, from its side, assisted the 
United States in its war on international terrorism and containment of drug-trafficking, 
provided humanitarian help to Afghanistan, guaranteed favorable investment climate for 
foreign investors, showed a worthy example of disarmament by shutting down the 
nuclear testing site and disposing nuclear weapons inheritance, presented an alternative 
source of oil supply lessening US dependence on the Middle Eastern oil.
As for the better future cooperation between the US and Central Asian states, 
several basic steps should be made. Firstly, US policy-makers should set clear priorities 
in Central Asia, and work out better policy based on deep knowledge of traditions and 
peculiarities of the region. Such deeper understanding could be achieved through the 
broadening of American presence in each Central Asian state by establishing embassies 
staffed by professionals who speak the local language, an intelligence apparatus, a Drug 
Enforcement Administration presence to discourage the growth of narcotics trafficking.
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Voice of America broadcasts, cultural exchanges, technical and Peace Corps advisors.^’  ^
Secondly, the US is in a position to diminish the possibility for instability in these 
countries through its mediatory role in dispute settlement and through addressing issues, 
such as nuclear proliferation, organized crime or narcotics trafficking, in a coherent, 
coordinate and interdisciplinary manner. Thirdly, the US should rethink its negative 
attitude to the spread of Islam in Central Asia. The new Western expression “Islamic 
threat” is misguiding and dangerous. Nowadays aggressive moods have nothing in 
common with peaceful potential of each religion based on mercy and kindness.^ '^^As 
Nancy Lubin proposed:
Instead of magnifying a potential Islamic threat, for example, it would be useful 
to understand in what ways Islam may play a constmctive role in Central Asia in 
the midst of upheaval and change.^ ’^
Fourthly, the US should rethink its policy toward Iran, in order to increase 
Caspian export options, though this could divert energy investment money from Caspian 
to Persian Gulf.^’  ^ An)way, it is not in the US interest to perpetuate American-Iranian 
hostility, hence, “[any] eventual reconciliation should be based on the recognition of a 
mutual strategic interest in stabilizing what currently is very volatile regional 
environment for Iran.” ’^  ^Fifthly, it would be wise to invest money not only in energy and 
related to it sectors but also into science and education, increasing professional level of 
Kazakhstani professors and lecturers via different exchange programs. As an example
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 145.
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(1997), p. 204.
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could be taken Chinese government, which sends approximately 3 thousand university 
lecturers abroad to conduct joint scientific research programs in more than 70 countries 
each year.^ *®
It is not a secret that we are living in the period of globalization and economic 
interdependence, when it is foolish to say that country borders could protect a state from 
unfavorable processes happening not only in a neighboring state but also in a distant 
region that has little relevance at home. Hence, in reality, many practical issues, such as 
narcotics trafficking and organized crime, control of nuclear weapons, regional instability 
and environmental devastation -  are capable to directly affect US national security 
interests. So the best option for the US is to have Central Asia as “a region of peaceful, 
democratic, and secular governments, committed to pluralism and respect for human 
rights” -  the society, which would eliminate nuclear weapons and adopt a control regime 
designed to prevent the proliferation of components and expertise; which “would be open 
to reasonable investment offers from the West and would protect the property rights of
OQ 1
investors”; and where relations with regional powers would be balanced. The 
development strategy should transfer multiethnic Kazakhstan not only into a strong 
industrial and agricultural country, but also into a significant oil-producing power with 
stable trade and economic ties with the rest of the world, and highly developed 
infrastructure.
R. M. Kalieva, “Diplomatiya Kazahstana na poroge novoi eri”, (15 May 1996), p. 4.
Robert Cullen, “Central Asia and the West”, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.). Central Asia and the World, 
(1993), p. 145.
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